ABSTRACT

TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE FUTURES: KEY INGREDIENTS IN DETERMINING CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION FUNDS FINANCE FOR SMALL ISLAND DEVELOPING STATES

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Financing climate change adaptation (CCAF) is perhaps the most critical challenge facing Small Island Developing States (SIDS), given their vulnerable characteristics. Despite funding and pledging commitments made by developed states under the regime of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), SIDS continue to require climate finance to meet current and future costs of adaptation measures. This paper argues that, unless SIDS address climate change adaptation finance (CCAF) immediately, their current vulnerability will exacerbate the fragile nature of their economies, resulting in further resilience and development issues. Using this as a framework, the paper will explore the following question, why CCAF is not available to meet the CCA requirements of SIDS. In answering this question, the following will be addressed: what quantum of climate change adaptation financing (CCAF) is required for SIDS, and by extension, the efficacy of the methods used in determining this total? Is this quantum of CCAF available for climate change adaptation (CCA)? In addition, the paper will examine how actors’ conduct influence the delivery of CCAF to SIDS.

The paper will assert that critical to understanding the nature of the CCAF regime is the interrelationship between climate finance discourses, climate finance actors and institutions and the climate poor. In this context, emerging trends such as mainstreaming adaptation costs into development funding, international climate change financial pledging, impact of GHG emissions from developing countries, increased focus on renewable energy sources and uncertainty in estimating CCA baselines merit examination. Further, the construction of identities, norms and interests among actors within the UNFCCC and the International Climate Change Regime (ICCR) provide the lens through which the problematic of CCAF and SIDS is examined. The paper will adopt a historical and content analysis approach to identify the variables emerging from the literature and deductive theorizing and analysis to identify the relationship among those variables and present the findings as constructs to the ongoing debate on the issue of delivery of CCAF and SIDS. The implication of this research is that closer attention should be placed on actors and institutions’ CCAF interrelationships across the UNFCCC and the ICCR and not only within the UNFCCC as an ongoing project, in order to arrive at consensus on the key ingredients required for delivery of CCAF to SIDS.

Key words: climate change adaptation finance, adaptation costs, climate poor, norms, interests, identities, vulnerability, SIDS, methods of estimation and UNFCC
1.0 INTRODUCTION

This paper sets out to determine why climate change adaptation finance (CCAF) is not available to meet the climate change adaptation (CCA) requirements of small island developing states (SIDS). We believe that, given the numerous conferences that focussed on SIDS over the decades, the recognition that climate change is a development SIDS negative and real possibilities that some SIDS are at risk of losing their entire economies, the difficulties surrounding CCAF flows to SIDS merit continuous research to identify solutions.

1.1 The Problematic

Notwithstanding decades of conferences and summits, embedded financial provisions in conventions and pledges, SIDS, as a whole, have been unable to access sufficient CCAF to meet their CCA needs. In the result, their nation states and economies have become more susceptible to sea level rise and vulnerabilities exacerbating their economic, social and environmental development.

1.2 Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework sets the boundaries for the philosophical debates surrounding the concepts for the study while, at the same time, acting as a tool to identify the relationship among the variables emerging from the concepts within the study. The debates surrounding the concepts will be presented as a philosophical argument throughout and the emerging variables will be linked deductively to generate findings. There are seven key concepts undergirding this research, namely: smallness; environmental conferencing; the international climate change regime; adaptation; sustainable development, uncertainty and climate change finance. In this paper these seven concepts constitute the essential characteristics surrounding SIDS.

1.3 Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework provides the boundaries for situating the research within the selected theory. Social constructivism is the theoretical foundation for this research and the lens for the study of the research phenomena. Even though other theories may be applicable to the study, neo-liberalism and neo-realism in particular, the researcher advances that the constructivist frame holds significant advantages over other theoretical approaches. There are six theoretical constructs undergirding this study namely: inter-subjective meanings; ideational structures; identities; agents; norms and interests.
2.0 EXPLORING THE CHARACTERISTICS OF SIDS

2.1 Smallness

One of the signal difficulties confronting small state analysis is an apparent discord on an acceptable definition of ‘small’ that all parties accept. Definitions of this nature are essential for categorisation, indexing and measurement in the context of small states. For the purpose of this paper, the author will use the Commonwealth Secretariat’s, 1997, figure of 1.5 million people as defining a small state. This definition also includes the larger populated countries of Jamaica, Papa New Guinea, Botswana, Lesotho and Namibia. According to Payne and Sutton (2007, 4) there are about 54 small states in the world, yet difficulties arise in terms of categorising small states for analysis, as they do not constitute an intelligible generic category.

In fact, Turvey (2007, 243-264) does not subscribe to any universally accepted definition of small island vulnerability. Additionally, Braehr argued ‘that small states form too broad a category for the purpose of an analysis’ (1975, 456-466). Contrastingly, Thorhallson (2012, 136) challenges the notion that ‘small states are held to be politically, economically and strategically vulnerable...’ Using the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as a unit of analysis, Thorhallson argues that classifying states according to economic variables such as GDP do not inhibit them from exercising power within the UNSC. In his view, the category of small states should also include the EU’s threshold of 10 to 15 million, which will result in a total of 110 small states. This, however, seems to be a rather intellectual view since international organisations such as the Commonwealth Secretariat, the World Bank, the United Nations (1992, Art 4:8;8) and several outcomes from key environmental conferences have all, to a significant extent, treated small states as a vulnerable group capable of analysis.

Defining the grouping ‘small island developing states’ (SIDS) appears less complex. Accordingly, the United Nations Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States (UN-OHRLLS, 2011:2) has defined SIDS as ‘...a distinct group of developing countries facing specific social, economic and environmental vulnerabilities’. A total of fifty-two countries have been classified as SIDS by UN-OHRLLS, of which thirty-eight are UN members. They are located in the Caribbean, Atlantic and Pacific, Mediterranean and South China Seas and the Indian Ocean. How well SIDS, as a category, influenced the flow of CCAF to support CCA plans and programmes is the essence of this paper. For the purposes of this paper, it is this group

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1 The Commonwealth Secretariat has a Small States Department that interacts with thirty-one small states. Visit http://thecommonwealth.org/our-work/small-states
2 Forty-nine countries participate in the World Bank Small States Programme, with a total population of 30.22m, GDP of US$174.0b, GDP growth 2.8% and Inflation at 2.0%. Visit http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/smallstates
of thirty-eight countries and the International and the Climate Change Regime (ICCR) that comprise the units of analysis.

2.2 Environmental Conferencing

SIDS (UN-OHRLLS, 2011) were recognized as a special case, in the context of their development (social, environmental and economic) at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (3–14 June 1992). This recognition was made specifically in the context of Agenda 21 (Chapter 17 (G)), which provided for sustainable development of small islands, technology transfer and provision of financial resources from developed states to small islands. (UN, 1992:178). In support thereof, several conferences on sustainable development of SIDS were held to promote their growing importance. The paper, however, will focus only on the milestone conferences in order to provide context for the relationships and expectations of SIDS within the International Climate Change Regime (ICCR).

Of significance was the conclusion of the first Global Conference on Sustainable Development of SIDS, which adopted the Barbados Programme of Action (UN, 1994). This programme was designed to address the specific challenges facing SIDS through defined policies and plans aimed at sustainable development with cooperation and assistance from the international community (UN, 1994:9). Six years later (2002) the United Nations Millennium Declaration was promulgated (UN, 2003) via Resolution 55/2. This declaration also focused on sustainable development of SIDS but, in particular, it emphasized “…the special needs of small island developing states…” and the importance of multilateral and bilateral donors to increase technical and financial assistance to SIDS (UN, 2003:05). The World Summit on Sustainable Development (UN, 2002) also labeled SIDS as a special case for environment and development with emphasis on investment support to improve their level of technology within the context of South-South technology transfer.

The Mauritius Strategy was launched in 2005 (Fixen et al 2005). Like previous SIDS conferences, the Mauritius Strategy emphasized sustainable development with a sharp focus on the environment and technology transfer that would help build resilience to combat economic, environmental and social vulnerability. The Third International Conference on SIDS which was held in Samoa (2014) reemphasized that SIDS remain a special case for sustainable development due to their vulnerabilities (UN, 2014:5) and that success depended on international cooperation from and among developed states. There were greater calls for technology transfer and technical assistance to SIDS.

However, the United Nations Summit For The Adoption of the Post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals (UN, 2015) promises quite a lot to SIDS. The post-2015 SDGs are anchored in the traditional context of sustainable development of SIDS along with technology transfer. However, of particular importance is the clear acceptance of sharp inequalities among citizens
and nations of the world, especially African countries and SIDS (UN, 2014). In this context, climate change planning, trade related capacity building, strengthening statistical capacities, mobilization of international finance, clean energy technology and renewable energy are offered as solutions.

2.3 The International Climate Change Regime

It is important to recognize some important shifts over the period leading up to UNFCCC 1992. In the 1940’s, international environmental emphasis focussed on preserving the resources of the natural environment (Sands 2005). However, by the 1950’s, the focus had changed to preserving the oceans’ resources (Sands 2005). In the 1960’s, 70’s and 80’s the emphasis was on preserving living and non-living resources in the earth’s biosphere, with particular attention to ozone depletion (Birnie and Boyle 2002). By the time of the UNFCCC in 1992, the international environmental scientific community had solidified it position that the danger to the earth’s climatic existence lay in preserving the biosphere. Hence, UNFCCC’s focus on reducing GHG emissions from fossil fuels that damage the earth’s atmosphere and negligible emphasis on reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+).

The objective of the UNFCCC (the Convention), adopted in 1992, is to stabilize greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous human interference with the climate system (UNFCCC 1992: Art 4). A key principle under the Convention is the provision of new and additional funding from developed states to developing states to combat climate change in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (UNFCCC 1992, Art 3 & 4). The principal instrument determining the obligations of the Parties to the UNFCCC in relation to emissions reductions is the Kyoto Protocol (1998). Under this Protocol, developed states listed at Annex 1 of the UNFCCC (1992) agreed to quantified emissions limitation and reductions (stipulated at Annex B of the Protocol) in order to promote sustainable development (Kyoto 1998). Consequently, developed and developing states agreed to hold the increase in global temperatures below 2º Celsius or 1.5º Celsius above pre-industrial levels (FCCC/ Decision 1/CP.16).

However, according to International Panel on Climate Change (2007), the concentration of GHG emissions in the earth’s atmosphere continues to rise over the past three decades and will continue its upward growth, despite current mitigation actions (IPCC 2007) that also allow monitoring and measurement of emissions reductions. However, this may be doubtful as IPCC (2014) projects with, high confidence, an increase in global temperatures beyond 2º Celsius (IPCC 2013).

Under the Convention, financial institutions serve to coordinate the activities relating to the provision of climate change financing (CCF). In this regard, a Standing Committee on Finance (SCOF) assists the COP in coordinating the delivery of climate finance within and outside the
Convention. The Global Environmental Facility (GEF), the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and the Adaptation Fund (AF) are the principal financial institutions established to provide CCAF to SDS. The Conference of the Parties (COP) guides the activities of the GEF, which is the only operating fund within the Convention. The members of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) replenish the GEF every four years, however, most of this funding targets calculable mitigation projects as opposed to adaptation measures (OECD 2012).

According to Kate Miles (2005, 202-211), GEF funding is insufficient to ensure sustainable financial flows to meet incremental costs of agreed global environmental benefits (GEF 2011). Additionally, Miles op cit (2005) argues that Agenda 21 recognized the need for additional funding and makes a case for innovative financing to supplement the CCAF deficit. These innovative financial ventures include; debt-for-nature swaps, conservation trust funds, tourism related taxes and fees, tradable quota systems and private sector payment for environmental services. Further, there is an international call to provide funding beyond the GCF in order to drive green growth (GGGI 2012).

Even though developed nations were to provide new and additional resources (UNFCCC 1992: Art 4), using the ‘fast start’ mechanisms (Copenhagen Accord), to the tune of USD 30 billion, there are no means to determine if indeed such funds would be new and additional, let alone which agency would manage such funds (GGGI 2012). Meanwhile, OECD (2012) has also recognized that mobilizing USD 100 billion per year by 2020 requires funds from private, public, multilateral and bilateral sources. Moreover, the proposed GCF, which is intended to operate as a coordinating mechanism for all financial flows from diverse sources (FCCC/2010 Decision 1/CP.16), is not operational and details relating to size, governance, powers, rules and members are still incomplete (OECD 2012).

The Least Development Countries Fund (LDCF), managed by the GEF, is a fund for adaptation measures geared towards supporting projects that attend to urgent and immediate adaptation needs of the least developed countries (OECD 2012). In addition, the GEF also manages The Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF), which finances activities such as adaptation measures and transfer of technologies that are complimentary to those funded by the GEF. On the other hand, An Adaptation Fund Board supervises the Adaptation Fund, which receives its revenue from a 2% levy of certified emissions reductions (CERs) earned for clean development mechanism (CDM) projects. However, revenue provided for adaptation depends on the quantity of CERs issued and the price they attract (OECD 2012). Consequently, there is a connection between financing adaptation measures and the efficiency of mitigation efforts through the CDM.
2.4 Adaptation

According to Fussel (2007), explaining adaptation is easier than defining it. As Fussel puts it, the effects of adaptation attract less profile than mitigation. Mitigation reduces the root cause of climate change whereas adaptation relies on uncertain and unpredictable regional climate and impact projections. Designing climate change plans (Fussel 2007) involves the use of present and future climate information to review the suitability of current climate change infrastructure, practices and policies. More importantly, adaptation to climate change is context specific as it depends on the social, climatic, environmental and political circumstances in the target region or area (Fussel 2007).

Climate change adaptation plans should also consider psychological behavioural factors. Gifford (2011, 290-302), submits that individuals are hindered by psychological barriers such as limited cognition about the problem and ideological world views that tend to preclude pro-environmental attitudes and behaviour. According to Gifford, citizens, therefore, need to overcome these barriers to contribute fully to climate change adaptation plans.

Erwin and Jordan (2008, 180-191) argued that though ‘climate policy integration’ (CPI) discussions focussed primarily on mitigation; there is a definite role for locally adaptation focussed CPIs. They identified, as bold beginnings, the United Nations Development Programme and the United Kingdom’s Adaptation Policy Framework on how to integrate climate change policies into all decision-making processes that support adaptive planning. Nonetheless, Erwin and Jordan advocate for a top down- bottom up approach towards policy making in order to improve CPI (Erwin and Jordan 2008, 180-191).

According to Biermann et al (2010), global governance architecture refers to the overall system of overlapping institutions, decisions making processes and norms in the area of climate governance. In this regard, a key issue to be resolved is whether a more centralised global climate governance structure organised around a central climate change treaty or a pluricentric and redundant system of governance would yield better results for climate change adaptation. Secondly, Biermann et al (2010) argued that the role of non-state actors, which pushes governance beyond the state, is also critical and relevant to global climate governance. Finally, the authors submit that notwithstanding all the mitigating efforts, global adaptation governance is necessary to prevent astronomical costs of mitigation and in providing support to climate adaptation plans. Further, Biermann et al (2010), in dealing with fragmentation of the global climate governance architecture, highlighted that fragmentation, depending on its typology, may result in benefits and burdens. Synergistic fragmentation, for example, may result in both costs and benefits. Ayers et al (2008), on the other hand, argued for a reframing of the adaptation agenda to meet the priority needs of developing countries, highlighting equal treatment for adaptation and mitigation. They further articulated for substantial and mandatory financial
commitments and a legal framework for adaptation implementation with a possible ‘adaptation protocol’ being developed.

### 2.5 Sustainability

A useful starting point in understanding sustainability is the Brundtland Report, which defined sustainable development as ‘development that meets the need of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (Our Common Future 1987). The report emphasised the importance of relative limits on the ability of the biosphere to absorb anthropogenic actions and the interrelationship between economic development and the environment. Mebratu (1988) noted that sustainable development is here to stay because the concept has endured and now formed the core element in policy documents of states, international organisations and business entities. Further, Sutherland (2008) advocated a three-pillar approach to understanding sustainability and defined it as ‘[recognizing] the interdependence of ecological, social, and economic systems...’ (Sutherland 2008:1688), whereas Pfahl, (2005) identified social, economic and environmental elements as the three core elements of sustainability.

The inter-generational and interdependent approaches to sustainability are not without dissent. Robinson (2009) believes that it may be politically beneficial to have some imprecision in the definition of sustainability and governments actually prefer the term sustainable development because the former highlights the dynamics between the environment and poverty which is more internationally appealing. Sneddon et al (2006) viewing sustainable development in a post Brundtland world goes further than the three pillar approach. They offer a pluralistic perspective. For them, 'A pluralistic, critical approach to sustainable development offers fresh interpretations of intractable environment-development dilemmas' (Sneddon, 2006:255).

Embracing pluralism in the context of sustainable development involves ecological economics, freedom oriented development, deliberative democracy and political ecology. Such an approach will enable a focus on global human communities and contribute to the enhancement of justice and equity. McMichael et al (2003) posits that the challenge and eventual success of sustainability depends on a vigorous and intensive interdisciplinary collaboration among key national sectors such as science, environment, ecology, ecosystems, biodiversity and economics.

Thus, a key feature in attaining sustainability by developing states is the degree of technology transfer from developed nations (UNFCCC, 1992:8). Equally important to the developed nations, is the issue of intellectual property rights and the protection of such rights in the transfer of technology arrangements (KPMG 2010). Equally important also, in poverty eradication, is knowledge transfer to developing nations (Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development 2002). However, there is a down side, and that is because research is expensive and follows a trickle down procedure, which involves justifications by researchers and political
interference by officials. In the result, the participatory approach is often used which allows for wider participation and access to alternative and easily available resources to solve environmental problems (Kerkhoff, 2006).

In addition, sustainable development can also benefit from partnerships formed under the Convention in pursuit of the Agenda 21 goals (Hale et anor, 2004). The authors, guided by empirical findings found that partnership programmes are more effective through: (a) establishing a learning network; (b) increasing transparency; (c) increasing private sector and small stakeholder participation; (d) establishing an institutional home to support partnerships; and (e) ensuring that the partnerships are consistent with multilateral priorities.

Environmental sustainability contributes to human welfare improvement by protecting the sources of raw materials required for ensuring that emissions from waste are held within the assimilative capacity of the environment and harvests rates for renewables are maintained within regeneration levels. Humanity must therefore learn to live within the limitations of the biosphere and maintain its natural capital, such as its forests, at sustainable levels (Goodland, 1996). In line with the thinking of Goodland (1996), Hammond et anor, (1998) suggests that ‘Environmental sustainability means changing human activities so they no longer threaten the natural [capital] resource base and ecological systems upon which economic development, human health and social well-being depend’ (Hammond et al. 1998). However, this natural capital is no longer a free good and has thus become a limiting factor to attaining and maintaining environmental sustainability (Goodland, 1998). According to Best (2012), maintenance of Guyana’s natural capital is likely to diminish if, in particular, its mining sector fails to meet required obligations under the LCDS.

Indeed a significant challenge to policy formulation for States, is finding the right balance between economic activities that result in environmental stress and economic development that is necessary for environmental sustainability (Hammond et anor, 1998). There is a view, however, that developed nations should understand that the key policy in development planning is the understanding that it is essential to combine industrial development and environmental sustainability thereby facilitating its full assimilation into macroeconomic development (Ghobadi and Valadbigi 2010). However, research also shows that democratization depends on the interpretation of environmental sustainability by government in the development process (Whitford et al, (2009).

Pfahl (2005) citing Keohane et al (1993), defines institution as containing a “Persistent and connected sets of rules and practices that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity and shape expectations. They may take the form of bureaucratic organisations, regimes or conventions” (Pfahl, 2005:83). In this context, one only has to look at Agenda 21 of UNCED to find that institutions held responsibility for sustainable development and practically all of the
tasks within that mandate. However, Pfahl, (2005) warns that existing institutions may impede the required results due to old practices of unsustainable conduct. Further, institutions must also facilitate decision-making. They must ensure representation of various interests at the policy level and that political instruments reflect decisions made at the local level. Institutions should also ensure that an integrated system is set up so that information reaches the citizenry through a feedback mechanism in order for citizenry information to return to the institution (Pfahl, 2005).

Paavola (2007) posits that, in the context of governance, institutional analysis can be more effective if it examines functional and structural tiers, organization of governance functions, and formulation of key institutional rules as the principal aspects of institutional design. Gordon (2000) believed that norms, values, adaptive behaviours and aggressive learnings must be enduring in order to narrow the social divides in the context of institutional sustainability. Institutional sustainability is therefore a principal factor in enabling sustainable development. Often times a charismatic leader or an entrepreneur may have been the catalyst for sustainability. It is therefore important to have appropriate institutions take over after individual champions may have led the way in a given project (Gordon et anor, 2000).

The performance of institutions must be measurable or assessable. Sustainability indicators for the evaluation of institutional achievements include participation in policy making such as NGOs; access to institutions and services; accountability; access by affected groups to national courts; capability of institutions to balance interests and improved equity. Add also to these categories, transparency, participation, responsiveness, and implementation capabilities. The categories could be wide and encompassing for institutional assessment. Key indicators for institutional sustainability as it relates to corporate activity would include reports on areas such as health, business, ecology, environment and employment impacts (Litten 2005). Indeed, Spangenberg et al, (2002) posited that sustainable governance is not possible without appropriate institutions and the use of scientifically based sustainable indicators to measure success. Even though these new categories have a bias to science and information technology, indications are that they would likely leave out greater participation by developing countries (Spangenberg et al 2002).

Sound long term strategic financial planning drives financial sustainability. Leaders should therefore stress that planning around a community of relevant actors results in credibility and speculation avoidance. Decentralised planning and resource alignment guarantee financial sustainability (Kavanagh, 2007). In the result, sustainability investments and assessment include and require, among others, energy use, resource and waste management and climate control. As an example, risks associated with climate change will include a valuation of carbon footprints from fossil fuels use in electricity, heating and transportation. Therefore, ecosystems services valuation is a useful financial sustainable activity in terms of developing and enhancing public environmental planning policies (Pittman et anor, 2007).
The concept of micro-financing is also useful in attaining financial sustainability, especially for poor households left out of the banking system because they lacked collateral. The argument is that micro financing that promotes institutional building of micro financing institutions and networks results in more opportunities for growth and savings than donor-driven subsidized programmes (Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, 2008). Contrastingly, Pitman et anor (2007) disagrees and, instead, posit that the best practices of the win-win non-subsidized approach has not manifested in increased micro-financing over subsidized financing. However, at the international level, international and environmental taxes, charging for the use of the global commons, the electromagnetic spectrum, biodiversity and debt-for-nature swaps contribute to financial sustainability (Mc Neely, 1996).

2.6 Climate Change Financing Regime

Though Kate Miles (2005) acknowledges that the Global Environmental Fund (GEF) is the single largest source of funds for global response to environmental protection, she posits that GEF funding is insufficient to ensure sustainable financial flows to meet incremental costs of agreed global environmental benefits. Additionally, Miles argues that Agenda 21 recognized the need for additional funding and makes a case for innovative financing to supplement the funding deficit because of inadequate funds. These innovative financial ventures include: debt-for-nature swaps, conservation trusts funds, tourism related taxes and fees, tradable quota systems, private sector payment for environmental services, right of way and access fees and fish catch levies. Miles calls these initiatives ‘a development tax for global environmental damage’.

Lord Nicolas Stern, supported by Global Green Growth Institute’s (GGGI) Chairman, Lars Rasmussen (GGGI, 2012), echoed the need for increased funding for climate adaptation at GGGI’s side meeting at the Eighteenth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP 18). He posited that additional funding beyond the Green Climate Fund (GCF) would be necessary and international institutions must use their ‘power of example’ to garner increased funding support for climate finance.

The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) website article on climate financing acknowledged that adaptation funding ranges between USD 100 to 200 million per year, in contrast to USD 14 to 21 billion per year (OECD, 2012). A large number of climate adaptation projects go unfunded due to financial shortfalls. Some developed countries insist that climate finance represent over overseas development assistance (ODA), which some developing states call payment for implementing specific climate measures. Even though under the Copenhagen Accord, developed nations were to provide new and additional resources, under the ‘fast start’ mechanisms, up to the tune of USD 30 billion, there are no means to determine if indeed that such funds would be new and additional together with no agreement on which agency should disburse these funds. Meanwhile, the OECD has recognized that mobilizing USD
100 billion per year by 2020 requires funds from private, public, multilateral and bilateral sources. Moreover, the recent UNFCCC (GCF) text proposes a mechanism for coordinating all financial flows from diverse sources and a new climate fund. However, details relating to size, governance, powers, rules and members are still being worked out.

The World Bank (2009) in a discussion paper on Monitoring and Reporting on Financial Flows Relating to Climate Change highlighted that Official Development Assistance (ODA) is tied to developing countries meeting their Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and funds allocated to climate change are not part of ODA’s commitment. However, several OECD countries see a close connection between climate change and development financing and argue for their non-separation. In addition, developing countries see climate financing as an entitlement for environmental damage done by developed countries. This difference in opinion makes it difficult to track and record effectively funding for climate adaptation. The World Bank paper (2009) suggests that climate change financing needs to be recorded in a systematic manner allowing for tracking, analysis and monitoring of progress made in the Copenhagen and post Copenhagen decisions.

Oxfam (2009:11-14) in its briefing paper Beyond Aid stated that adaptation finance is channelled through a spaghetti bowl with multilateral and bilateral mechanisms. It argued that this has led to a current ad hoc approach built on inappropriate infrastructure, which in turn leads to underfunding and opaque complex results. The Oxfam paper also pointed out that adaptation funding is not demand driven but influenced heavily by donor countries. Adaptation plans are underfunded and there are too many empty pledges by the international donor community. The paper further posited that there must be predictability and reliability of raised funds for climate adaptation.

There are various opinions on the amount of funds needed for climate adaptation. According to the Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN) of the United Nations (UN), no one is really sure what amount is really needed for climate adaptation. The UNFCCC has estimated that by 2030 poor countries would need between $28 billion and $59 billion a year to adapt. The World Bank thinks between $20 billion and $100 billion should do it. The European Union Commission put the amount between $10 billion and $24 billion a year by 2020, and the African Group of climate change negotiators arrived at a sum of more than $67 billion a year by then. Notwithstanding this uncertainty, IRIN posits that only five percent of the funding needed for climate adaptation is being realised (IRIN 2012). The news release also notes that the Bali Action Plan emphasised the need for climate finance flows to be to new and additional funding that are verifiable, reportable and measurable.

After COP 18, developing countries remained disappointed in funding flows. They anticipated funding for the period 2013-2020 but no agreement was reached on this issue. They are stuck with a promise of USD 100 billion by 2020 and according to Saleemul Huq, Senior Fellow with International Institute for Environment and Development’s (IIED) Climate Change Group, this is
another vague promise of maintaining current levels of climate finance which approximates to USD 10 billion per year (IIED 2012).

Smith et al (2011), argues for coordination and integration of development and adaptation funding. In their view, several ODA funded projects that relate to climate-sensitive issues and development oriented private funded projects that take climate risks into consideration contribute to the cost of adaptation. Therefore, coordination of development and adaptation funding could avoid duplication of efforts and costs savings. Already the need for coordination is recognised in current climate negotiations. In a Policy Brief on the Adaptation Fund, Elsie Remling et al (SEI 2013) observed that a key purpose of the Fund under the Kyoto Protocol (UN 1998: Art 12) was to use a share of the proceeds of the clean development mechanism (CDM), now at 2%, to assist developing countries that were particularly vulnerable to climate change in meeting their costs of adaptation. The writers found that Parties to the UNFCCC are yet defined the term ‘particularly vulnerable’. Instead, the project proponents define vulnerability, which in turn leads to difficulties in achieving efficiency and equity in the allocation of funds for adaptation.

There are four adaptation-related funds that were established at the international level. There are three under the UNFCCC- the Least Developed Countries Fund (LCDF) in 2001, the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) in 2005 and the GEF Trusts Fund’s Strategic Priority on Adaptation (SPA) in 2004. The Adaptation Fund (AF) was the fourth to be set up under the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC in 2007 (Haegstad et al, 2009). The AF will finance implementation of concrete adaptation projects in non-Annex I countries, including activities intended at avoiding forest degradation and combating land degradation and desertification (Bouwer and Aerts, 2006:49).

Of critical note is the fact that all three of these funds are undersubscribed to by the developed countries for reasons that include lack of confidence in accounting procedures and mechanisms in developing states (Ayers and Huq, 2008). One disadvantage to most developing countries lies in the fact that parties to the Kyoto Protocol have access and possible influence over the AF, contrastingly, developing nations were able to establish an independent GEF independent Board comprising a majority of members from the developing nations under that GEF arrangement. The Fund is not donor dependent. It is funded through a 2% levy on CDM transactions. However, it is difficult to predict quantities as the fund depends on the CDM market and the price of CDM credits.

Developing nations have also expressed concerns over high transaction cost, burdensome rules and reporting, co-financing and unclear guidance when dealing with GEF managed funds for adaptation. However, the situation is slightly better with the AF, which has an independent GEF Board. Horstmann (2011, 1086) while pointing out the process of direct access and independence of the GEF and ODA of the AF as positives, nonetheless stressed the need for the Adaptation Fund Board (AFB) to define terms such as ‘level of vulnerability’ and ‘adaptive capacity’ which,
in turn, will enable a vulnerability-oriented approach to allocation of funds for adaptation projects. Horstmann also adds that the country-oriented driven process of the AF might itself hinder the AFB agreeing and accepting a scientific definition of vulnerability and instead should seek a political approach to find an acceptable definition.

Haites (2011, 963) submits that determining costs of adaptation is difficult because adaptation measures are yet to be defined. This lack of definition precludes any reasonable estimation of the associated capital and operating costs. As a result, scenario based sectorial costing is done which compares the cost under a scenario based on the current climate with the cost under a scenario based on the projected future climate, which in itself is unpredictable. Sectors include, ecosystems, coastal zones, forests, extreme weather, infrastructure, fisheries, water supply and agriculture. According to Haites, costs are usually estimated for the ‘hard’ adaptation measures and rarely include ‘soft’ adaptation measures such as capacity building and information systems. In spite of measures used, there will be ‘residual damage’ from adaptation measures. Whether such damage is an adaptation cost is yet to be determined. Further, determining whether ‘increased resilience’, achieved through development funding, is an adaptation cost is also uncertain. The close association between development assistance and adaptation funding compounds this uncertainty. Adaptation may well result in meeting development needs and development may assist in adaptation.

Smith et al, points to two approaches used to estimating adaptation costs. The first is a World Bank (WB) initiative, which estimates the costs of reducing vulnerabilities of climate-sensitive investments (such as foreign direct investment and development assistance) in developing countries through a ‘mark up’ factor. The second approach uses costs for projects identified for adaptation funding under the National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) for a limited number of developing states and scales up the amount to cover all developing countries. Notwithstanding this initiative, Smith et al, identifies that the current approaches exclude the inability of present societies from fully adapting to climate change. This shortfall is called ‘adaptation deficit’, which is excluded from the estimate baseline and costs estimates. All these factors result in uncertainty and unpredictability in estimating costs of adaptation.

2.7 THE EMERGING VARIABLES

The following variables have emerged from exploring the characteristics of SIDS: uncertainty; vulnerability; generic category; small states too small a group for analysis; insufficient financial funds; innovative financing; funding beyond the GCF; uncertainty about quantity of adaptation funds; differentiating between overseas development assistance and new and additional finance; different approaches to estimating adaptation costs; predictability of pledged funds; verifiable, measurable and reportable new and additional finance; high international transaction costs; uncertain definition of vulnerability; uncertainty about adaptation measures; interrelationship
between economic development and the environment; interdependence of ecological, social, and economic systems; interdisciplinary collaboration among key sectors; protection of intellectual property in technology transfer; balancing economic activities and environmental sustainability; balancing information flow to and from citizens through institutions; micro financing; definition uncertainty; limited cognition; climate policy integration; fragmented global climate governance; mainstreaming adaptation into development, adaptation deficits; influence of non-state actors; sustainable development; international financial cooperation; technology transfer; special case for sustainable development; new and additional funding; emissions reductions; common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities and incremental costs.

3.0 SITUATING THE VARIABLES WITHIN (SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVIST THEORY)

We contend at the outset that international cooperation among states may well decide the extent of success in receiving CCAF. Another significant characteristic of international relations (IR), is the ability of states to forge agreements through multilateral participation and the interrelationships of norms, structures and interests as ingredients in their domestic and international actions. Though we will reflect the views of some key (IR) theories, this paper will focus more on situating the variables within the theory of social constructivism. However, only some of the variables will be examined in this paper.

Kenneth Waltz (1990) posits that neorealists focus on the interaction of states which produces international anarchical structures where autonomy, operating at the structural level, is the unit level counterpart to anarchy. Waltz (2000) pointed out that the anarchical system remains but peace is fragile (Waltz, 1998; Ripley, 1993). Unipolarity is now the new structure at the apex of international state action. As long as states continue to harbour fears about their future, relative gains will be the coveted prize and anarchy will continue (Waltz 1988). Donnelly (2009, cited in Burchill et al, 2009) adds that pressures beyond structures push states in certain directions resulting in misleading structural expectations. Cooperation under anarchy is possible but a system of payoffs may be needed, since continued interaction and reciprocity affect cooperation (Oye 1985). Grundig (2006) found that ‘global warming falls within the empirical domain of neorealism and ... power based explanations cannot be ignored’ (Grundig, 2006: 781). Further, the presence of neorealism theory in the context of environmental issues does not readily suggest that cooperation will be absent. In fact, the presence of power within states influences cooperation among them (Grundig 2006).

Neoliberalists believe that cooperation between states is achievable through the interaction and interrelationship of institutions. In this regard, Ruggie (1982) posit that a set of mutual expectations by actors who depend on rules, regulations, organized energies and financial commitments interrelate to underpin institutions (Ruggie 1982). In this context, neoliberals
believe that international institutions that use norms, rules and precise decision making processes operate to mitigate obstacles to cooperation (Reus-Smit 2009 cited in Burchill et al, 2009). They also believe that international relations is not a zero sum game and that states prefer to focus on absolute gains as they perceive mutual benefits arising out of cooperation in common areas (Burchill et al, 2009). However, neoliberals do acknowledge the role of non-state actors in reducing tensions associated with neorealism while, accepting that states were indeed the principal actors in world affairs (Keohane 1986). Keohane further posited that there is a need to create order out of anarchy without any superordinate power because realism, as a theory, is insufficient for world stability and peaceful change.

On the other hand, Harvey (2005) identifies several failures of neoliberalism. According to Harvey, neoliberalism resulted in privatization and commodification of public assets; financialization driven by speculative practices; management and manipulation of crises which results in wealth redistribution from rich to the poor and state redistribution. Together, these practices worked to create a wider economic and financial gap. Harvey called it ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (Harvey, 2005: 160). Similarly, Castree (2010) posited that the recent financial crisis of 2007, due to deregulation and over accumulation of the capital mode of production, was a serious blow to climate change efforts and that market led approaches to generate greenhouse gas reductions will fail. Correcting this situation, he proffered, required a re-regulation of global financial mechanisms including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

Multilateralism is ‘... an institutional form, which coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of generalised principles of conduct,’ (Ruggie 2000:109). These principles, allowed to operate freely, specify the proper conduct for various types of actions in a non-discriminatory manner, levelling the field and leading to problem solving in the area of the commons (Ruggie 2000). Gavin (2005), on the other hand, characterizes multilateralism as being concerned more about achieving the optimal-sized market for trade. Robert O’Brien et al, (2000) explain that new multilateralism is a form of multilateralism, built from the bottom and based significantly on global civil society’s participation, which goes beyond the concept of non-state actors. Zoellick (2008) called for a new multilateralism that is flexible and not fixed.

Zoellick advocated a type of multilateralism based on shared interest and responsibility, which would recognize that climate change, is an economic issue and that every country must be allowed to mitigate and or adapt to it. Complex multilateralism, according to O’Brien (2000), is a term used to describe global economic governance transformation resulting from the interaction of multilateral economic institutions and global social movements, primarily reflected through environmental, labour and women’s engagements. Higgott (2004), on the other hand, argued that multilateralism is a limited concept and international problems result from the interplay over time of inevitable structural changes within the global governance paradigm, driven by policies of the great powers. According to Langenhove (2006), multilateralism is also associated with
conflicts of interests and identity uncertainly. The European Union is a good illustration in this context, since it does not sit at the United Nations as a single state but instead it holds multiple seats at several tables. A key disadvantage, however, is multilateral inaction may promote unilateral action (Schuller and Grant (2003)).

We further contend, that within all theories examined above, structures, actors and institutions exist within them which are influenced by norms, interests intersubjective meanings, ideational structures, agents and identities. We now turn to social constructivism and the key constructs that are present in all of them.

According to Reus-Smit (2009), constructivism is characterised by the constitutive relationship between agents and structures, emphasising the significance of normative and material structures and how identity contribute to shaping political action by states and international organisations. Constructivists argue that systems of shared ideas, values, interests and beliefs possess structural characteristics that influence social and political action (Finnemore and Sikkink (2001, 391-416, O’Neil 2004, 149-175). Consequently, these collective concepts allow the generation of identities through international interaction (Reus-Smit 2009). Methodologically, constructivists reject the supremacy of a single scientific method used in the generation of knowledge, adopting instead, a plurality of approaches and interpretive strategies. Ontologically, they emphasise the social construction of actors’ identities, and the importance of identity in the constitution of interests. Epistemologically, they question positivist approaches to knowledge, criticizing attempts to formulate objective, empirically verifiable truth statements about the natural and social world (Reus-Smit 1998, 259-294)

O’Neill (2005) posits that agency depends on the actoriness of the agents in the production of definitive results irrespective of the anticipation of such results. Adler (1997, 319-363) views constructivism as occupying the middle ground between rationalist and relativist interpretive approaches to understanding international relations. In his view, constructivism is more about the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by actors’ normative and epistemic interpretations. Viotti and Kauppi (2011, 278-279), on the other hand, offer four key perspectives of constructivism. First, constructivists seek to problematize the identities and interests of states, arguing that identities and interests are not givens (Wendt (1994, 384-396) and interests go beyond agents to include international and transnational organizations. Second, constructivists view the international structure as a social whole comprising norms, rules and laws capable of influencing the identities and interests of agents and even international results. Third, constructivists see the world as a project under construction, getting there, but not there. Finally, constructivists dispute the belief that pure objectivity exists given the subjective nature of the human being.
Contrastingly, Finnemore and Sikkink (2001, 391-416), argue that constructivism provides a framework for analysis of social reality and interaction leading to an understanding of how, over time, social facts change and influence politics. Wendt (1994, 384-396) argued that the formation of collective identities ‘among states could emerge endogenously at the systemic level [generating] cooperation and transforming systemic anarchy into an international state (Wendt 1998: 384, Moisio, 78-95). Epstein (2004, 327-350), distancing himself from Wendt’s (1999) essential state paradigm, argued that discourse provides an opportunity for open analysis in studying identity. It also avoids the influence of assumptions about the actors’ selves in studying identity and explaining agency where the concept of the essential self assumes that what works at the individual level also work at the state level. Schopflin (2001, 1-10), on the other hand, argued that expansion into the non-material sphere threatens our identity. For him, identities are constructed around a set of moral values and there is a hierarchy of norms, which requires actors to be judgemental in condemning, or approving types of behaviour. Consequently, we take refuge in our 'collective' identities to resolve our individual fears without knowing whether collectives will impose their own identities on the weak.

Payne (2001, 37-61), argued that persuasive communication is critical to norm –building. In practice, however, norm entrepreneurs, using material levers, often create ‘issue’ frames for their benefit and those who control power, in order to promote a specific norm or norms. In somewhat similar terms, Acharya (2004, 239-275) argues that agents, in diffusing norms, reconstruct foreign norms to fit with their cognitive priors and identities. Congruence, as opposed to persuasive communication, thus becomes the key to norm acceptance. Mandelbaum (2006,305-341), in contrastingly different terms, argued that norm diffusion such as the invocation of international norms domestically, takes place within the context of state identity, identity crises and how secured that particular state is about its own identity. This means norms may matter differentially depending on the states’ identity and the extent of its resources.

Krook and True (2010, 103-127), posit that diffusion of international norms affect policy and political behaviour. They view norms as dynamic processes of adoption and implementation and that a discursive approach is best suited for theorizing and analysing life cycles of international norms. Bjorkdahl (2002, 9-23), on the other hand, argued that norms are a useful and lasting analytical tool in analysing international relations because states rely more on norms, ideas and values as opposed to the traditional ‘think’ about distribution of power. This mutual constitutive relationship between norms and interests serve to provide states with opportunities to pursue their preferences. Perkins and Neumayer (2007, 13-41) found that compliance with international obligations occurs through the legitimization of norms internally with local institutionalized acceptance. In this regard, they argue that civil society plays a key role in entrenching, mustering and sanctioning normative obligations at the domestic level.

However, constructivists have their critics. Reus-Smit (2009), points to internal division within constructivism itself over the nature of theory. One school disbelieves that a general theory of
international relations is possible. The other school, led by Alexander Wendt, op cit, believes it is possible and has proceeded to prove this possibility putting him at odds with most constructivists due to his focus on the systemic level only, his adoption of the state as a unitary actor and his resort to a concept called scientific realism.

4.0 FINDINGS

Interests

We found that a significant number of the emerging variables within this study represented interests within the context of states, non-state actors and institutions. In examining differentiating between ODA assistance and new and additional finance as an interest, we found that this is a constructed interest influenced by state and non-state actors for the benefit of the powerful actors and agents within the ICCR. Consequently, this interest only enjoys intersubjective meanings and shared understandings amongst the powerful actors and agents within the ICCR, excluding the SIDS grouping in the process, who continue to argue that new and additional funding as provided for under the UNFCCC convention excludes ODA funding. Equally, verifiable, measurable and reportable new and additional finance, as an interest, represents intersubjective understandings and relationships amongst the powerful actors and agents within the ICCR. The levers of control to measure, verify and report new and additional finance are located within the institutions of the powerful actors.

Similarly, mainstreaming adaptation into development planning is an interest viewed by SIDS as constructed to benefit international financial institutions, which in turn leverage national financial mechanisms within the SIDS grouping. The mutual constitutive relationship between agents and this ideational structure is limited to the influential international financial organisations. However, SIDS continues to advocate that mutuality and acceptance of a full understanding of adaptation is necessary for this interest to be construed as universal.

Likewise, climate policy integration, as an interest, is driven by the concerns for reducing GHG-a climate change activity not required by SIDS under the UNFCCC- but yet imposed on SIDS by the ideational structures within the ICCR. We found that there is no mutually constitutive relationship between these actors (within the ICCR) and SIDS. Correspondingly, interrelationship between economic development and the environment; interdependence of ecological, social, and economic systems; interdisciplinary collaboration among key sectors and balancing economic activities and enviromental sustainability are interests constructed for the benefit of the powerful within the ICCR, especially since SIDS have no real endogenous capability of realizing these outpiuts without international assistance and cooperation. We believe these interests should enjoy shared understandings and mutually constituted relationships across all actors within the ICCR, in particular SIDS and be allowed to develop into norms of substance within the environmental regime.
We found that **technology transfer** is an embedded provision within the UNFCCC and a declared expectation in the outcomes of the major SIDS conferences. Ideally and using a norm development pathway, technology transfer should have reached norm status by now. Historical conditioning of technology transfer residing in the developed ‘north’ also contributed to shaping its characteristics. Nonetheless, this interest enjoys wide intersubjective meaning and understandings, but is still more material than ideational. We believe that **protection of intellectual property** is a competing interest to technology transfer and consequently, inhibits the growth of technology transfer into an ideational structure. Of course, the actors and agents enjoy asymmetrical technological advantages over SIDS.

We believe that **high international transactions costs** are a constructed interest, which result in financial transactions for SIDS a difficult task. Intersubjective meanings and understandings and mutually constituted agents and structures are limited to the key actors in the ICCR. We found that high international transactions costs are conditioned more by financial security considerations rather than objective calculation. Here again, the ICCR has constructed other complimentary interests such as ‘lack of confidence in financial and accounting institutions in SIDS’ with shared meanings amongst the major actors within the ICCR. Additionally, **micro financing** is an important interest for SIDS. Though there is evidence of mutual construction, intersubjective meanings and ideational congruence, we believe that interests such as lack of confidence in financial institutions and high transactions costs serve to militate against the benefits therefrom. We also believe that other financial related interests helpful to SIDS, such as **innovative financing**, promoted by academics in the literature, is unable to be socially constructed by SIDS, since it represents a contrasting position to the major financial actors within the ICCR.

**Capitalizing the GCF** is undoubtedly a keen interest of SIDS and of the key actors within the ICCR. However, we found that the ideational structures that shape the quantum of CCAF is exclusive to SIDS grouping. In many respects, the funding regime within the ICCR seem to have developed an identity which suggests that quantifying CCAF is a deliberative exclusively of the funding regime.

We found that **global climate governance**, as an interest, reflects in both SIDS and the wider ICCR. However, global climate governance is dominated by the developed states within the ICCR through identity formation within groupings such as Conference of the Parties (COPs), International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and others, even though there is also identity formation within SIDS, such the OASIS grouping. Consequently, ideational structures to support these identity formations are compartmentalised into shared meanings, rules, practices and norms reflected of the identity formations.
Identity

The extent to which shared meanings, rules, norms and practices are contained in a structure is the extent to which identity can be said to be present. In examining the SIDS grouping, we found that it contained shared meanings, rules, norms and practices, thus conforming to identity in constructivist terms. In this context SIDS, as an identity, would contain intersubjective understandings amongst its actors and agents. Further, we believe that the identity SIDS has been habitual in the context of its consistent advocacy for SIDS to be so defined within the ICCR. This is further evidenced within the international discourse referencing SIDS and influenced by the actions of other states. In this context, the SIDS identity is informed by its norms, rules and practices rather than its own self-interest. We, however, found that there isn’t sufficient shared meanings, rules, norms and practices to determine that vulnerability, as an identity, has been formed within the wider ICCR, but we do believe that vulnerability has risen to the level of identity within the SIDS grouping. In like manner, we found that a SIDS identity as a generic category exists within the wiser ICCR and SIDS grouping based on the social relationships within the ideational structures that collectively speak to this issue, in particular, the UNFCCC and numerous climate change conference outcomes. In fact evidence of historical usage and continuous discourse of the term generic category, or derivatives therefrom, strengthens our belief that the term generic category is widely accepted SIDS identity.

We do not believe that limited cognition, as an identity, has been sufficiently developed to merit concurrence. Limited cognition, in this context, related to cognizance of the phenomenon of adaptation by SIDS. We submit that the shared meaning, rules, norms and practices of SIDS in relation to adaptation and, particularly its importance to their survival and resilience, is sufficient to conclude that limited cognition is not an identity particular to SIDS. However we have no conclusion, at this time, as to whether it is an identity recognized within the ICCR. We found that non-state actors as an identity meets the criteria set above, though, we believe it to be doubtful that their actions are necessarily supportive of the SIDS agenda given that their identity is conditioned by interests within the ICCR. However, we found that sustainable development, as an identity, represents an ideational structure with intersubjective meaning and understandings among actors and agents within the ICCR, including SIDS.

Norms

We found norm formation to some extent within the ICCR. In the context of recognizing norms as accepted values that describe standards of suitable behaviour for actors and agents, we believe that the variable common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR) has matured to norm formation. Several features surrounding norm formation and diffusion attach themselves to this variable. In the first instance, CBDR is embedded within the UNFCCC, which provides for its location. Secondly, CBDR, as embedded within the UNFCCC, operates as
a standard or rule in determining how states shall protect the climate system. In this context, we found that CBDR helped define the identity of the UNFCCC- a norm specific characteristic- and should be considered a formed norm within the ICCR. Additionally, it was the ICCR, inclusive of non-state actors, through persuasive communication that helped form the CBDR norm. In this regard we submit that the norm CBDR has constitutive effect within the ICCR as it served to influence states to redefine their attitude to climate protection.

However, the diffusion of the norm CBDR is not without difficulties. We found little evidence that the CBDR norm was diffused and invoked domestically within the ICCR, including SIDS. This, of course limits its identity as descriptive rather than prescriptive. Consequently, SIDS have been also unable to exploit the CBDR norm for CCAF within the ICCR because it was not legitimized internationally, internally and institutionally. As a central plank in allocating responsibilities and resources to climate protection, the absence of diffusion of the CBDR norm created climate finance deficits for SIDS. We believe that an identity of division shaped and was shaped by contrary interests within the ICCR.

Another embedded variable within the UNFCCC is technology transfer. However, we do not believe that technology transfer, though embedded, matured into a norm. In our view, the persuasive communication accompanying technology transfer created issue frames that were controlled and influenced by the principal actors and agents within the ICCR. Consequently, the absence of, and in some cases, limited provision of technology transfer, continues to be an issue frame from the perspective of SIDS. Competing with the issue frame of technology transfer is the issue frame of protection of intellectual property. We found that within the ICCR, these two frames seemed to have merged into one frame where the actors mutually constitute each other. In other words, shared meanings and understandings are evident within this merged frame to the benefit of significant actors and agents. For similar reasons we found that international financial cooperation was unable to mature into a formed norm.

However, we found that new and additional financing (NAAF), as an embedded variable, possesses the attributes of a formed norm. In the first instance, NAAF is embedded within the UNFCCC, which provides for its location. Secondly, NAAF, as embedded within the UNFCCC, operates as a standard or rule in determining how states shall separate and classify their funding obligations under the UNFCCC. In this context, we found that NAAF helped define the identity of the UNFCCC and that of the ICCR. Additionally, it was the SIDS grouping, in particular, inclusive of non-state actors, through persuasive communication that helped form the NAAF norm. In this regard we submit that the NAAF norm has constitutive effect within the ICCR as it served to influence states to redefine their attitude to apportioning CCAF.

Similarly, the NAAF norm experienced challenges in diffusion. We found evidence of identity and interest formation that conflicted with this norm. In particular, the issue frame of differentiating between ODA and NAAF acted out in favour of the key actors within the ICCR by advocating for ODA to be considered as NAAF. This, of course limits its identity as descriptive
rather than prescriptive. Consequently, SIDS have been also unable to exploit the NAAF norm for CCAF within the ICCR because it was not legitimized internationally and institutionally.

We found that sustainable development (SD) matured into a norm and enjoyed diffusion internationally, internally and institutionally. The SD norm exhibited similar attributes of the CBDR and the NAAF norms, however, persuasive communication and a keen intention by all to utilize the world’s natural capital in such a manner that preserves it for future generations contributed to positive diffusion within the ICCR and SIDS. So successful it was, that there is a contrasting view that the SD norm may be over clichéd.

However, we do not believe that vulnerability has matured into a norm within the ICCR. This is in large measure due to doubts surrounding the meaning of the said term. Other variables that fall into this category include, adaptation finance, adaptation deficit and particularly vulnerable.

CONCLUSION

Why CCAF is not available to meet the CCA requirements of SIDS?

Our attempt at answering the above question is limited by the research data available at the time of writing and our own constraints in not analyzing all the possible data available. Our suggested answer incorporates our findings in relation to interests, identity and norms within the ICCR. We believe that CCAF is not available to meet the CCA requirements of SIDS because the interests constructed within the ICCR created intersubjective meanings and understandings exclusive to the SIDS grouping. This meant that the powerful actors within the ICCR took control of the CCAF narrative as it related to CCAF and generally allowed those shared intersubjective meanings and understandings to shape and be shaped by identities formed within the ICCR.

Identity formation within the ICCR presented a further challenge to CCAF not being readily available to meet the CCA requirement of SIDS. The identities formed were mutually constituted among the powerful actors and agents within the ICCR. In the result, identity formed shaped interests and were shaped by interests created among the powerful actors. In this regard, the ideational structures generated comprised rules, norms and practices that inhibited SIDS to be effective as an identity and from effectively receiving CCAF for their CCA development.

Finally, norm formation had its own impact on CCAF flowing to SIDS for CCA. Even though several key norms were embedded the UNFCCC and supported by persuasive communication, except for SD norm, their diffusion were limited by definition uncertainty, non legitimization internally and internationally and issue frame merger to the benefit of the more powerful actors within the ICCR. In the end, limited shared understandings and mutuality of the formed norms serve to restrict the availability of CCAF to SIDS for CCA development.
RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are made:

1) The SIDS grouping needs to expand its identity formation within the ICCR
2) The SIDS grouping should consider realigning its interest to achieve congruence with that of the key actors within the ICCR
3) The SIDS grouping should consider very long term no interest financing as an additional option to NAA
4) The SIDS grouping should advocate for ICCR support for innovative financing (international taxes accruing to SIDS) in order to reduce the financial stress related to CCA for SIDS.
5) The SIDS grouping should insist in parity between mitigation and adaption financial allocations
6) The SIDS grouping should advocate for technological capacity building as opposed to technology transfer
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