

## **Contested territoriality: Ethnic Challenges to Colombia's Territorial Regimes**

First Draft

11/15/2009

Marcela Velasco  
Assistant Professor  
Political Science Department  
B 348 Clark Building  
1782 Campus Delivery  
Fort Collins, CO 80523-1782  
Marcela.Velasco@colostate.edu

### **Abstract**

This paper studies ethnic social movement challenges to territorial regimes in three regions of Colombia. The comparison draws on the recommendations of the contentious politics literature to identify mechanisms that shape struggles for local autonomy, a necessary condition recognized by the literature on common pool resources for the sustainable management of the commons. Ethnic social movements contest territorial regimes that reduce local autonomy and use strategies of resistance to claim self-determination. Resistance is shaped by three mechanisms: (1) alterations of territorial regimes threatening autonomy, (2) the tactics of organizational agents to achieve autonomy and (3) deliberative activities to understand the conditions limiting autonomy. The paper sustains that resistance may have favorable effects on the sustainable use of natural resources if local organizing leads to autonomy embedded in contexts of democratization. The paper underscores the transformative potential of conflict if it renovates power structures limiting autonomy.

Paper presented at the 2009 Amsterdam Conference on the Human Dimensions of Global Environmental Change 'Earth System Governance: People, Places and the Planet'

## Introduction

Struggles to govern ancestral lands implicate ethnic groups and governments in territoriality claims. In Latin America these lands enclose strategic topsoil and subsoil resources of interest to revenue-seeking governments and investors, and to groups claiming self-determination (Carruthers & Rodriguez 2009; Sawyer 2004). Territorial conflicts are ever more contentious as governments restructure domestic economies to increase exports and attract foreign investments by expanding agricultural and extractive activities. To learn about the effects of territoriality conflicts on environmental governability, I study the resistance strategies of ethnic-territorial social movements seeking to modify regional governance rules in three departments of Colombia. Ethnic-territorial social movements assert group rights over geographic areas to guarantee their cultural survival through strategies of resistance. Resistance draws on a range of contained and transgressive contentious political strategies including bartering, self-defense, civil disobedience, legal recourse, social movement tactics, and armed confrontation (Hernández 2004).

A conflictive and rapidly changing society, Colombia is a good case for examining conflicts between power-holders and contentious actors debating the legitimacy, original meaning and effectiveness of territorial institutions. This paper compares the territorial resistance strategies of three social movement organizations seeking self-determination—the Cauca Regional Indigenous Council (CRIC), the Indigenous Organization of Antioquia (OIA) and the Interethnic Territorial Union of the Naya (UTINAYA)—during episodes of contention including the 1960s agrarian reform, the 1970s agrarian counter-reform, the social upheaval leading to the 1991 constitution, and the current resistance against militarization and territorial occupation by irregular armed groups.

The paper also addresses ongoing critiques raised by common pool resource (CPR) analysts that call for an assessment of governance rules under the lens of the social movement literature (Berkes 2002). To do this I evaluate how autonomy, a necessary condition to manage resources sustainably under common property regimes, is shaped by ethnic social movement resistance to government-defined territorial regimes limiting self-determination. My comparison finds that resistance is shaped by three interrelated mechanisms: (1) alterations of territorial regimes threatening community autonomy, (2) the tactics of organizational agents to broker

autonomy, and (3) training or deliberative activities to understand the conditions limiting autonomy. The paper sustains two main findings. First, ground-breaking institutional change follows if resistance strengthens local-level organizational capacity and asserts territorial autonomy. Second, the outcome of such change may have favorable effects on the sustainable use of natural resources if processes of democratization are underway.

The paper begins with a brief presentation of ongoing criticisms to the CPR literature and addresses them by introducing concepts of territoriality and insights from the contentious politics literature. It then presents the three cases. The Cauca/CRIC case frames the process of resistance in a historical setting and as a response to territorial regime transformation, underscoring the relationship between social movement organizing and territoriality. Antioquia/OIA is then used to highlight the role of social movement entrepreneurs in brokering strategic alliances with the local government to secure Indian territoriality. Finally, the Naya/UTINAYA case serves to underscore the role of deliberation in developing a social movement agenda when political and economic conditions go against social movement organization. The comparison is based on the analysis of social movement documents, interviews and field notes based on participation and observation in various social movement meetings and training activities in the departments of Antioquia, Cauca and Valle, and in the city of Bogotá between 2007 and 2009.<sup>1</sup>

### **Autonomy, Institutional Change and Social Movement Contention**

This paper addresses ongoing critiques raised by CPR analysts calling for an evaluation of the role of history, identity formation and the effects of conflict on the management of the commons (Agrawal 2005). To do so this analysis builds on the recommendations of the contentious politics literature on conflict and institutions, and refers to these critiques more specifically by focusing on social movement challenges to territorial regimes. Territorial regimes are government-defined practices of governability within a given space (Kahler 2006: 5) and territoriality refers to spatially organized social transactions embodying relations of power, access to resources and networks of collective action (Beaumont & Nicholls 2007). Ethnic territoriality counters the incorporation of ancestral land into state-centered territorial regimes by

---

<sup>1</sup> Including, Mesa Manglar meeting (Buenaventura, Valle, January 2007), meeting of CRIC elders (Toribío, Cauca February 2007), meetings of the Interethnic School for Conflict resolution (August 2007-June 2008), meeting of Bajamar residents (Buenaventura, Valle, June 2009) and meeting of Carmata Rúa youths on Life Plans (Jardín, Antioquia, June 2009).

negotiating ethnic rights within national judicial structures that conceive the relationship between people and their habitat in terms of property rights (Chirif & García 2007). In order to protect lands and maintain access to resources—including common pool resources—Indians bargain autonomy within such regimes.

Common pool resources are defined as natural and human made goods characterized by the difficulty of excluding users and the subtractability of the good, and such goods can be easily depleted in the presence of unsustainable environmental governance practices. The CPR literature finds that common property regimes are well-suited to govern sustainably the use of water, forests, fisheries, irrigation systems among other common goods in the presence of clear property rights, autonomy, and democratic procedures (Agrawal 2002; 2003), and conversely, such regimes may lead to overexploitation under conditions of poor institutional design, unclear property rights and deterioration of local rules (Agrawal 2003; Hardin 1968; Ostrom 1990; Ostrom et al 2002). The literature also finds that communities of CPR users find it increasingly hard to achieve the required levels of local autonomy allowing them to define appropriate governance rules. For one these communities are affected by rapid climate change, deforestation and global markets (Dietz et al 2003) and only those that manage to negotiate their autonomy with the wider political systems can be resilient (Tang & Tang 2001). More often than not, autonomy pacts are successful if brokered by agents that can establish clear and non-threatening links between the outside society and the group.

The CPR literature has been criticized for playing down the interplay of complex local and extra-local processes—including deliberation, long-term strategy, political ambitions, local configurations of power, and moral narratives that mobilize communal support for a specific collective goal—and for relying exclusively on “in the moment” rational choice analyses (Turner 2004). In a similar vein, Agrawal (2003) also suggests that CPR analysts relax the rational-choice and apolitical property rights assumptions guiding much of their research and Berkes (2002) calls for an assessment of the rules and processes governing the commons under the lens of the social movement literature. Such evaluations suggest a more nuanced understanding of the role of history, identity formation and the effects of conflict on the configuration of common property regimes and the management of common pool resources.

The literature on contentious politics offers ways to bridge such criticisms through the study of specific mechanisms underlying episodes of conflict. This literature defines social

movements as a form of transgressive contentious politics that mobilize new political actors, change identities and use innovative forms of collective action (McAdam et al 2001). The literature also proposes a methodological approach focused on identifying three rough types of concatenating mechanisms<sup>2</sup> that explain diverse outcomes. According to Tilly (2001) *environmental* mechanisms are “externally generated influences on conditions affecting social life” and refer to settings that constrain actors such as regime environments, resources and physical surroundings; *relational* mechanisms “alter connections among people, groups, and interpersonal networks” and produce alliances, divisions, conflict or cooperation among social actors; and *cognitive* mechanisms involve ideas and values and change individual and collective perceptions of sociopolitical reality. The analysis of these mechanisms suggests that social movements operate in dynamic fields, respond to structural conditions, affect individual and collective perceptions of threats and opportunities, form new actors and agendas, mobilize resources through extensive social networks, and block or enable institutional change (Aminzade et. al. 2001, McAdam et. al. 2001, Davis et. al. 2005).

Resistance is a form of contentious politics that combines survival tactics of exertion, counteraction and compliance and draws on contained and transgressive means. People who have developed what Eckstein (1989) calls a culture of resistance overcome problems of collective action by building a sense of community. This comparison of Colombian organizations has identified three major mechanisms shaping the politics of resistance: Environmental mechanisms involving territorial regime alterations that threaten communal autonomy; relational mechanisms referring to the tactics and resources mobilized by organizational agents and brokers; and cognitive mechanisms developed through educational and deliberative activities that train and indoctrinate leaders, activists and community members.

Ethnic resistance is territorially based and surges when political change reduces local self-determination by facilitating government or third-party use and exploitation of land and resources. Territoriality claims affirm governability and networks of collective action (Beaumont & Nicholls 2007) and offer advantages for the coordination of followers and leaders, and provide collective defense (Goemans 2006), all imperative conditions for the politics of survival. Territoriality helps overcome problems of collective action not so much because “land contains

---

<sup>2</sup> Mechanisms are “delimited sorts of events that change relations among specified sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations (McAdam D, Tarrow S, Tilly C. 2001. *Dynamics of Contention*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.)

important natural resources that can be translated into tangible assets, but because it plays the more important role of defining one's social, spiritual, and communal world” (Walter 2006). Ethnic territoriality seeks to establish common property regimes not just for political and economic reasons, but for symbolic meanings and functions in the reproduction of local social relations. The outcome of this process affects environmental governability.

### **Case selection and description**

Ethnic-territorial organizations represent indigenous- and African-Colombians at the local and regional levels. In the case of Indians, community organizations (*cabildos*)<sup>3</sup> generally unite one cultural or linguistic group. *Cabildos* associate at the departmental<sup>4</sup> level in indigenous multi-ethnic organizations that support the community's territorial claims. Finally, departmental organizations are associated at the national level. Similarly, Afro-Colombians with claims to ancestral lands are organized at the local, regional and national levels. Ethnic political parties, popular social movements, and in some cases, municipal administrations located in the proximity of ancestral territories support (or are supported by) ethnic-territorial organizations.

The three organizations compared in this text are examples of ethnic-territorial social movements that differ in various ways. They were founded under different territorial and political regimes, in dissimilar regions and by diverse ethnic groups. They also vary in organizational scope. The Cauca Regional Indigenous Council (CRIC) and the Indigenous Organization of Antioquia (OIA) are department-wide organizations, while the Interethnic Territorial Union of the Naya River (UTINAYA) is a sub-regional organization.

The CRIC represents more than 250,000 people, while OIA and UTINAYA represent around 25,000 people each. Table 1 provides summary information on these cases. Such Geographic and temporal variability help highlight differences in regional economies, resources, and local government dynamics, and underscore that neither elites nor state institutions in Colombia are homogeneous. All three organizations however suffer the effects of conflict which is exacerbates the violent appropriation of territorial resources for extractive use, and the brutal

---

<sup>3</sup> *Cabildos* or indigenous councils are colonial-era institutions that administer internal affairs within indigenous communities and reserves (See Law 89/1890). *Cabildos* oversee matters of land distribution, conflict resolution, rule implementation, resource management, and are elected every two years by *comuneros* or community members. *Cabildos* constitute legitimate authorities in Indian lands and are constitutionally recognized and can manage directly decentralized fiscal resources.

<sup>4</sup> Colombia is divided into 32 administrative departments.

uprooting of entire communities by paramilitary, drug traffickers and guerrilla groups, often with state involvement.

**Table 1. Summary of regions**

Region and Organization	Regional Socioeconomic and Political Characteristics	Demographic Characteristics	Population	%	Organizations	History of Resistance
Cauca/CRIC	Conservative elites. Strong political and religious center during colonial and Republican periods. Hacienda-based production. Productivity increased by exploiting indigenous labor. Large groups of indigenous people, concentrated in geographical areas.	Department's Population	1,182,022	100	Cauca Regional Indigenous Council (CRIC) founded in 1971. Founded during National Front.	Dates back to colonial period
		Popayan, capital city	258,653	22		
		Indigenous population	248,532	21		
Antioquia/OIA	Modernizing elites, industrial region, mining and agrarian economy, small percentage on indigenous groups, spread out in different regions of the department.	Population	5,601,507	100	Antioquia Indigenous Organization (OIA) founded in 1986 during Transitional governments.	Dates back to 1980s
		Capital city: Medellin	2,219,861	40		
		Indigenous population	28,914	1		
Naya River (Cauca and Valle)/Utinaya	Frontier land, little state presence, old settlements of indigenous and traditional Afro-Colombian communities. Newer settlements of mestizo peasants and nasa indians.	Naya River Popula	21,523	100	Interethnic Union of the Naya River (UTINAYA) founded 2003 during Neoliberal or post 1991 constitution	No history of resistance
		Eperara Siapidara	296	1		
		Nasa	3,209	15		
		Black and mestizo	1,018	5		
		Afro-Colombians	17,000	79		

Challenges to state-centered territorial regimes and to what Agrawal (2005) calls government technologies modifying the management of resources, vary according to the regime in place. In a similar vein Indian social activism in Latin America has been framed as a response to changes in citizenship regimes that reduce de-facto self-determination, the most relevant transformation is the change from corporatist or populist, state-centered regimes to neoliberal, market-oriented regimes of interest mediation (Yashar 2006). Colombian politics after 1958 can be divided into three political regimes: the National Front Period (1958-1974), the Transitional Period (1975-1989), and the Neoliberal Period (1990-present). The National Front is the name given by Conservative and Liberal party elites to the sixteen-year power sharing government agreement implemented between 1958 and 1974 to end violent partisan conflict. The “transitional” governments between 1975 and 1989 slowly dismantled the undemocratic National

Front institutions, some of which survived until 1986, and introduced the first liberal reforms. The neoliberal governments that came after 1990 instituted the liberal reforms by replacing the Constitution of 1886 with the 1991 Constitution that sanctioned far-reaching political and economic transformations.

CRIC is the oldest and most contentious organization and was founded in 1971 in the Cauca department during the less democratic National Front governments. This organization represents Nasa, Misak, Coconuco, Totoró, and Yanacona Indians who share a contiguous territory in the central Andean region, an area of old colonization. OIA was founded in 1986 under the transitional governments and represents Embera, Tule, and Zenú ethnic groups sharing contiguous territories in areas of newer colonization, and discontinuous territories in regions of old colonization. Finally, UTINAYA was founded in 2003 in the neoliberal period, and represents people who live in the territory covered by the Naya River, including contiguous territories shared by Indian (Eperara-Siapidaara) and Afro-Colombians in the middle path and mouth of the river, and by mestizo peasants and Nasa Indians in the upper path of the river. The capacity of these organizations to shape territorial governability and their participation in specific episodes of contention varies significantly.

### **The Cauca Story: A History of Resistance**

The Cauca Regional Indigenous Council (CRIC) leads the development and dissemination of resistance strategies. The CRIC summarizes the Indian movement's political platform in terms of historical struggles for land, autonomy and culture dating back to the time of conquest (Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca. 1975; 1977; 1979; 1980; 1983a; b). After the Conquest indigenous peoples were forced into the status of subjects of the Spanish Crown and later, of wards of the Colombian government (Cortés 1984; Diaz 2001; Findji & Rojas 1985; Gros 1991; Zuluaga 2001). Once confined to Indian towns or reserves resistance strategies included feigning illness, claiming inability to organize enough people to work in Spanish properties, insubordination and escape (Zuluaga 2001). Cauca Indians also adjusted to their new reality by protecting their autonomy through strong organization and strategic interaction with local and national markets (Pachón 1996).

By the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century Indians were weakened by de-facto reduction of their land holdings, semi-enslavement and decades of acculturation. However, two important territorial

regime changes occurred that sowed the seeds of later conflict: the 1886 constitution that reduced the size of the Great Cauca state<sup>5</sup> and Law 89 of 1890 on Indian reserves. The 1886 constitution centralized the country's administrative divisions and reduced the territory of the Great Cauca from 670 thousand km<sup>2</sup> to 30 thousand km<sup>2</sup>. As the Cauca population decreased from 435 thousand in 1871 to 206 thousand in 1905, the most obvious effect was the loss of 90% of tax revenues (Castrillón 1970). To mitigate their economic loss, the Cauca hacienda owners in Popayán further increased the exploitation of indigenous lands and the institution of *terraje*—an exploitative labor institution dating back to 1721 when the *encomienda* system was abolished.<sup>6</sup>

Law 89 was passed in 1890 to provide indigenous people land stewardship to mitigate the effects resulting from their transition from “a savage state to one of civilization.” This law reflected the government's expectation that indigenous territories and cultures would disappear, and contains articles that guarantee the stability of the reserves while Indians are in a “savage” state. The law recognized the authority of the *cabildos* as representative institutions, delimited Indian lands, and established that reserves could not be divided, embargoed or extinguished without court approval. If people in a particular place spoke an Indian language, kept Indian traditions or recognized themselves as Indians, but had lost their lands, a wrongful and illicit act had been committed. This law later enabled Indians to defend their autonomy and protect their territories.

Between 1914 and 1917 Manuel Quintín Lame a Nasa “*terrajero*” laid the foundations for the Indian struggles of later years. Lame led a series of Indian uprisings called the “*quintinadas*” aimed at forcing landowners in the departments of Cauca and Tolima to leave occupied Indian lands and release *terrajeros*. Lame also resorted to legal campaigns in Bogotá to recover the original titles of the Indian reserves and to secure central government protection of Indian lands by enforcing Law 89 from 1890 (Castrillón 1973; Lame 1971; 1973; 1987). By 1930 however, unfavorable legislation and government repression against Indians and their lands increased the cost of resistance.<sup>7</sup> By the forties and fifties, selective assassination of Indian leaders and violent expropriation of Indian reserves by landowners extinguished the movement.

---

<sup>5</sup> Dismembering it into the current departments of Cauca, Nariño and Valle.

<sup>6</sup> *Terrajeros* were Indians allowed to live in the hacienda lands—often lands taken away from the Indians themselves—in return for working for the hacienda owner (Castrillón D. 1973. *El indio Quintín Lame*. Bogotá: Ediciones Tercer Mundo). This institution survived well into the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

<sup>7</sup> The Junín and Pichincha Battalions from the cities of Popayán and Cali contained the *quintinadas* and captured Lame and several of his closest followers.

The partisan Violence of 1946 to 1958 also deteriorated the political and economic lives of indigenous people and led some Indians to join peasant self-defense groups to protect Indian towns from violence.<sup>8</sup>

Prior to the foundation of the CRIC, some Cauca Indians participated in peasant enclaves founded by Liberal guerrillas to protect peasants and members of the Communist Party from government persecution. These “independent republics” as they were known, were founded during the military government of Gustavo Rojas Pinilla (1953-1957) and led a de-facto agrarian reform project in remote, wooded areas in the eastern slopes of the Oriental Cordillera, in the department of Tolima (Uribe 2007). According to Gros (1991) Nasa Indians who participated in this organization learned about land reform and spontaneous resistance, undoubtedly an important precedent for the CRIC.

### **Territoriality during the National Front: The Cauca Regional Indigenous Council**

By the early 1970s land conflict and exploitation of Cauca Indians had reached unsustainable levels. In a clear violation of Law 89 of 1890, of the seventy reserves that existed at the beginning of the 20th century in Cauca, there were only 48 left in the early seventies, and most of these had been invaded by non-Indians (Cortés 1984: 51). On the other hand, the Indian *cabildos*—the surviving colonial era community organizations designed to organize Indians in the reserves—were for the most part co-opted by church and local politicians. Land shortage led to overexploitation of resources and loss of productivity, forcing younger generations to migrate. In the 1970s, 80% of the Cauca population—a rural and agricultural department—depended on having access to land for survival (Gros 1991). As a result, land conflict between Indians and *hacienda* owners was on the rise.<sup>9</sup> In 1970, Nasa and Guambiano Indians supported by the *cabildos* of Guambía and Jambaló associated in the short-lived Eastern Cauca Syndicate,<sup>10</sup> an unsuccessful union that nevertheless helped reduce differences between the two ethnic groups, an important step to forming the multi-ethnic CRIC (Gros 1991). Indians also participated in the protests of sugar-cane workers from the town of Corinto and in the struggles of homeless urban

---

<sup>8</sup> In 1949 for example, the village of Belalcazar was attacked and the Indian *cabildo* from the town of San Jose was massacred, and Indians effectively defended the towns of Santo Domingo in 1950, and Jambaló and Mina in 1956 (Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca. 1977. *Historia política de los Paeces*. Popayán: CRIC.)

<sup>9</sup> Such was the case of the Haciendas el Credo and el Chimán in the towns of Tacueyó and Silvia.

<sup>10</sup> Sindicato del Oriente Caucano

dwellers who invaded land in two districts of the town. Finally, in the town of Padilla *terrajeros* from the Garcíabajo hacienda succeeded in recovering some of their land.

The CRIC emerged in February 1971 from an assembly of 2000 Indians from 11 Cauca towns, including delegations of peasants and workers (Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca. 1989). The organizational field (McAdam & Scott 2005) that influenced the foundation of the CRIC involved regional labor conflicts and national events, namely the 1961 Agrarian reform and the founding of the National Peasant Association (ANUC). The field was constrained by the National Front governments of the Liberal Carlos Lleras Restrepo (1966-1970) and the Conservative Misael Pastrana (1970-1974). Lleras passed measures to modernize rural relations of production and Pastrana led an agrarian counter-reform that reverted land distribution. In sum, Lleras mobilized peasants in a top-down process, and Pastrana sided with rural elites to contain peasant activism and dismantle the agrarian reform.

Even if the organizational field was dominated by the National Front's pacification agenda limiting independent popular organization, these governments also designed preventive policies to reduce the chances of a popular revolution in the countryside (Edwards & Steiner 2000). In 1961 the government passed an "Agrarian Social Reform" (Law 135/61) aimed at developing national capitalism through the redistribution of unproductive land among landless peasants in order to improve productivity and expand markets. President Lleras passed Law 1 of 1968 designed to turn sharecroppers into landowners, thereby affecting the institution of *terraje* in Cauca. Using extraordinary executive powers, President Lleras also decreed the formation of the National Peasant Association (ANUC) to support the newly formed National Institute of Agrarian Reform (INCORA) by organizing peasants from above (Zamosc 1983). One regional effect of Law 1 was the eviction of *terrajeros* by Cauca landlords eager to avoid problems with INCORA. Once evicted, *terrajeros* had two choices: leave the farms established on their ancestral lands or organize to recover them with the help of INCORA officials.<sup>11</sup>

Cauca Indian peasants became avid supporters of ANUC and INCORA's officials who encouraged mass mobilization and land takeovers (Cortés 1984), and of the Indigenous Secretariat that opened opportunities for Indians from different parts of the country to meet

---

<sup>11</sup> Cortés (1984: 56) includes the following account of a former *terrajero* who lived with 80 others in a hacienda owned by the González family near Popayan: "When we heard about the INCORA in 1969, we sent a commission to report that we could not be evicted from the land where we had always lived. When Samuel (González) realized that the INCORA was going to affect his farm he only recognized 6 *terrajeros*..."

(Asociación de Usuarios Campesinos. 1974). Notwithstanding their support, Indians held misgivings about ANUC's political platform defending private property and the creation of government-sponsored peasant user organizations<sup>12</sup>—Cauca Indians defended collective land titles and the traditional Indian *cabildos*<sup>13</sup>.

Influenced by these events and rallying the *terrajero* struggles, the CRIC defined a political platform that “showed less faith on the government” (Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca 1989). The seven-point platform set out to recover Indian lands, increase the size of the reserves, strengthen the *cabildos*, end the institution of *terraje*, disseminate and demand the enforcement of indigenous laws, defend indigenous history, language and customs, and train indigenous educators to teach in their native tongue. Other points later included sought to strengthen economic organizations, protect natural resources, and achieve the national unity of indigenous peoples (Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca. 1979; 1989).

The CRIC's local strategy was to penetrate *cabildos* dominated by local politicians, members of the government's armed forces or the church and replace them with CRIC sympathizers or militants. Doing this was of vital importance to recover Indian autonomy considering that *cabildos* were occasionally used to dissolve reserves and distribute lands in favor of landlords or the church.<sup>14</sup> Gathering *cabildo* support was required to strengthen the CRIC and mobilize more Indian communities. To achieve this, the CRIC decided to participate in the 1972 government census that would allow it to visit Indian communities in the Cauca in order to disseminate its agenda, find new leader and link new regions and *cabildos* to the CRIC (Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca. 1979) .

The early years of the organization were characterized by organizational weakness and strong repression against activists, leaders and collaborators. Cauca landowners also reacted by conforming bands of killers hired to put a stop to land recoveries. CRIC frailty was compounded by lack of support from the majority of the *cabildos* and from internal divisions. By 1973, the government of Misael Pastrana put a stop to Lleras' efforts at agrarian reform by passing Laws 4 and 5 of 1973 that enforced the so-called Chicoral Pact, an agreement between landlords and politicians to end the government expropriation, purchase and distribution of land (Rodríguez et

---

<sup>12</sup> *Juntas de Usuarios Campesinos*

<sup>13</sup> According to Gros (1991) the CRIC emerged as a local variant of the national peasant movement led by ANUC, and maintained close relations with ANUC's Indian Secretariat in the first three years after its founding.

<sup>14</sup> Velasco M. 2005. Group Interview: Indigenous Movement Advisors Bogotá

al 2005). Peasants and Indians responded to the counter-reform by promoting land invasions and constituting independent organizations from government sponsorship.

Notwithstanding this frailty, by 1973 CRIC had reconstituted 17 *cabildos* and recovered ancestral lands occupied by eight haciendas in the towns of Silvia, Tacueyó, Corinto, and Jambaló.<sup>15</sup> It also recovered 900 hectares from three haciendas in Paniquitá and Popayán.<sup>16</sup> In response to these developments, Cauca landowners secured the region's militarization and by 1975 almost all the indigenous territory was occupied by government forces. This did not stop CRIC and its allied *cabildos* from promoting new production strategies by organizing 38 stores and 47 cooperatives in 13 different Cauca municipalities (Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca, 1979).

By 1979 however, the CRIC was almost disbanded as a result of simmering internal divisions dating back to 1975. While the details are complex, some Indian and white collaborators disagreed with the CRIC on two main points: first, its failure to create a genuine Indian organization (not a hierarchical organization mimicking the labor movement) that would strengthen traditional Indian authorities and second its agenda of working with INCORA—the land reform institute—to secure land titles (Laurent 2005). CRIC supporters found such *indigenista*<sup>17</sup> attitudes naïve, unrealistic for the Colombian context and even dangerous if they divided the frail and embryonic Indian movement.<sup>18</sup> CRIC leaders believed that organizational success and Indian survival depended not only on strengthening indigenous forms of organization and authority (i.e. the *cabildos*), but also on interacting strategically with state elites and other social groups, including blacks, peasants, workers, and the middle class. They also believed that *indigenismo* would compound Indian marginalization by alienating non-Indians thereby missing political opportunities created by the establishment of multiple class, ethnic and sectorial alliances. The dissidents went on to found an organization initially called “Indian Governors in the March<sup>19</sup>” and later “Movement of Indigenous Authorities of the Southwest.”

---

<sup>15</sup> Chimán in Silvia; El Credo, la Susana and el Alba in Tacueyó; la Ester, la Siberia and Santa Elena in Corinto; and Zumbico in Jambaló.

<sup>16</sup> The haciendas of San Antonio and la Concordia in Paniquitá, and Cobaló in Popayán.

<sup>17</sup> This refers to a “nativist” or “Indianist” early 20<sup>th</sup> century-movement of middle class artists and intellectuals from various Latin American countries, especially Mexico and Peru. As an ideology, it generally spouses pro-Indian, anti-Hispanic values, and seeks to change prejudiced and racist views of Indians in society. *Indigenistas* were and continued to be criticized for romanticizing Indian cultures Kay C. 1989. *Latin American Theories of Development and Underdevelopment*. New York: Routledge and for alienating mestizo or Hispanic members of society.

<sup>18</sup> Efraín Jaramillo, personal communication, June 2008.

<sup>19</sup> Gobernadores Indígenas en Marcha

However, government repression of the Indian movement had the unintended consequence of consolidating the Indian movement in general.

To contain the movement, Julio César Turbay Ayala (1978-1982) tried to pass an “Indian Statute” to enable the president to draft a “Legal Regime of Indigenous Peoples.” The Indian statute was connected to the 1978 “Security Statute” that toughened up measures to detain, interrogate, and judge civilians suspected of subversion or drug trafficking (Archila 2003). The Security Statute provisions were frequently used to persecute leaders and militants of popular organizations not necessarily linked to the guerrillas. In 1979, the government took advantage of this statute to detain and torture a number of CRIC Indian leaders and mestizo activists, including the organization’s president Marcos Avirama, after accusing them of belonging to the M-19 guerrilla movement.<sup>20</sup> In addition to incarceration, there were selective assassinations of Indian activists, militarization of Indian communities, and raiding and burning of cooperatives.

CRIC activists went underground but nevertheless prepared an offensive against the Indian Statute. If passed this Statute would effectively break up the *cabildos* by requiring that they apply for legal status<sup>21</sup> and by giving the government the right to certify the “existence of Indian communities” and to “control, inspect, and monitor the associations, corporations or foundations working with Indians” (Cortés 1984). The statute would also redefine Indian territories as fallow lands at the disposal of landowners and entrepreneurs. In sum, the statute would repeal law 89 of 1890 thereby annulling customary rights to land and autonomous political organization. According to Jesús Avirama even if law 89 “was inspired by the colonial spirit that states that we are minors unable to exercise the right to sell our land [the law] recognizes, however, the *cabildos* as the authority within the reserve” (Avirama 1979). This episode of contention ended when two congressmen defeated the Statute arguing that it violated the rights of an ethnic minority.<sup>22</sup>

These threats against the organization and its territoriality project had the unintended consequence of consolidating Indian organization and social networks. CRIC activists denounced the Indian Statute and government violence in gatherings of national and international

---

<sup>20</sup> In early 1979, M-19 guerrillas raided the military’s Northern Canton in Bogotá and stole 5,000 pieces from its arsenal.

<sup>21</sup> Personería Jurídica

<sup>22</sup> *Unidad Indígena*, no. 39, p. 11. Cited in Cortés P. 1984. *Desarrollo de una organización indígena: El Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca, CRIC*. Popayán: Banco de la República, Fundación para la promoción de la investigación y la tecnología

delegations such as the 1979 Human Rights Forum and the Latin American Parliament meetings in Bogotá; and obtained the support of groups such as Amnesty International, the Russell Tribunal, as well as domestic groups including the Jesuit-sponsored Center for Research and Popular Education (CINEP), the Human Rights Commission, and groups of students<sup>23</sup> among others (Cortés 1984). Indian activists also produced a unity platform to create and empower organizations in other regions of the country. The first national indigenous congress—which led to the foundation of the National Indigenous Organization of Colombia (ONIC) in 1982—convened in Lomas de Ilarco in 1979.

Until the early 1980s the CRIC sought to consolidate the organization, recover lands, reclaim the *cabildos*, promote Indian education, create alliances for mobilization, strengthen the Indian movement in Colombia, and overhaul state-Indian relations (Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca. 1983b). The CRIC however needed to move an agenda of economic development to lift communities out of poverty. In 1983, CRIC's Seventh Congress raised environmental restoration and economic production as top priorities (Rodríguez et al 2005), and by 1985 reforestation and experimental agriculture plans were constituted in the town of Purace as model land management programs to restore deteriorated lands, increase production and teach best-practice lessons (Chernela 1988). CRIC enlisted outside technical support to develop appropriate methods, including the use of organic agricultural techniques. Decision-making processes were restricted to the *cabildo* which was responsible for raising funds to buy inputs and organizing communal work. Chernela (1988) describes that eight different communal units alternated work days, with each community working seven days per year and participating in the preparation of lessons-learned workshops. By 1988 the agricultural station was providing a major portion of food consumed in the region, feeding the community and producing a surplus sold in Puracé and Popayán markets. Increased production in once-sterile lands became an important symbol of environmental regeneration and organizational empowerment (Chernela 1988).

Currently, Cauca's more than 250,000 Indians<sup>24</sup> live in a territory of about 544,901 hectares of land, provoking discontent among local non-indigenous landlords (Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca. 2007). In 1999 for example, in an attempt to free themselves from blame,

---

<sup>23</sup> Estudiantes de Antropología de la Universidad de los Andes. 1980. Comunicado de estudiantes de antropología de la Universidad de los Andes acerca del Proyecto de Ley para las comunidades indígenas. Mimeo. Bogotá

<sup>24</sup> 261,144 people according to CRIC and 248,532 according to the government. Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca. 2007. Presentación de tierras y presentación institucional. Popayán: CRIC; Departamento Administrativo de Estadística. 2007. *Colombia, una nación multicultural. Su diversidad étnica*. Bogotá: DANE

the Association of Cauca Growers, a large landowners union, argued that Indians constituting about 21% of the department's population possessed 40.6% of agricultural lands, thereby becoming the department's largest landowners (Paz 2001). Paz (2001) unveils how this is a politically charged manipulation of the facts by analyzing data produced by the Cauca government's Regional Planning Unit that demonstrates that Indians have about 95,000 ha of agricultural land, the remaining lands enclose resources including water and forests.<sup>25</sup>

By claiming that Cauca's land is in general suitable for agriculture, landlords not only deny Indian rights to land and their historical obligation to redistribute prime-agricultural real-estate, but also reveal their "agro-centric" stance on land-use. In spite of the Indian's movement regional success, prime agricultural land in Cauca continues to be concentrated, making land conflict a major problem for Cauca's poor whose livelihood depends on access to arable lands.<sup>26</sup>

### **Territoriality during the Transitional Regimes: the Antioquia Indian Organization:**

By the late 20<sup>th</sup> century, Antioquia's indigenous population had been reduced to around 9,000 people<sup>27</sup> and their land reserves to a few hundred hectares. By the 1970s, the Embera Katío in the west of the department had lost 240,000 hectares, the Embera Chamí of Cristianía in the southwest were living in 140 hectares, the Tule in the north had only 600 hectares, and the landless Zenú—who had lost their language and were no longer considered Indians by the government—were trying to settle areas throughout the lower Cauca and Urabá regions (Salazar

---

<sup>25</sup> Of the three million hectares comprising Cauca's territory, 51% are covered by forests, 5% by settled forests, 31% by grasslands, 11% by agricultural lands and 2% by land unsuitable for agriculture. Paz JM. 2001. Estructura de la tenencia de la tierra: 1973-1997. In *Territorios posibles: Historia, geografía y cultural del Cauca*, ed. G Barona, C Gnecco, pp. 199-215. Popayán: Universidad del Cauca. Paz also analyzed land-use in the seven municipalities<sup>25</sup> concentrating the highest Indian population—about 126,000 people—and found that only 85,424 of the 579,134 hectares were suitable for agriculture, a much lower number than the 527,800 hectares claimed by the Cauca growers in 1999. On the other hand, according to CRIC studies, Cauca Indian lands comprise 544,901 hectares of which 35.1% consist of mountain forests, 17.6% of cultivated lands (i.e. 95,603 ha), 13.2% of grasslands, 12.7% páramos,<sup>25</sup> 10.7% stubble, 8.2% uncultivated lands, 1.3% planted forests, 1.2% swamps, and 0.01% urban areas Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca. 2007. Presentación de tierras y presentación institucional. Popayán: CRIC.

<sup>26</sup> Between 1973 and 1997 the number of small landowners (<20 ha.) changed from about 108,999 to 191,934 and their holdings increased from 341,527 to 446,186 hectares of land. Meanwhile, the number of big property owners (>100 ha.) increased from 2,110 to 2,683 and their holdings from 568,218 to 1,014,620 hectares of land. During these years, the land extension of properties increased 64% from 1,199,023 to 1,871,007 hectares of land Paz JM. 2001. Estructura de la tenencia de la tierra: 1973-1997. In *Territorios posibles: Historia, geografía y cultural del Cauca*, ed. G Barona, C Gnecco, pp. 199-215. Popayán: Universidad del Cauca, suggesting that the agricultural frontier has been expanding in the Cauca department.

<sup>27</sup> According to available data from 1550, 1778, 1835 and 1989, at the time of conquest there were about 600,000 Indians in Antioquia and by the 1830s it was reduced to 158,014. See Salazar CA. 2000. *Dayi Drua - Nuestra tierra: Comunidad y territorio indígena en Antioquia*. Medellín: Gerencia Indígena, ONIC.

2000). In sum, Indians had been practically annihilated in Antioquia—one of Colombia’s most industrialized and economically developed departments—and indigenous political organizing was virtually non-existent.

Antioquia’s indigenous people were dispersed in isolated areas and prior to 1976, afflicted by poverty, high mortality and church-led acculturation.<sup>28</sup> But in contrast to Cauca, Antioquia’s political elites differed as they shared what could arguably be called a “progressive mentality” more willing to address Indian demands and reduce escalating conflict.<sup>29</sup> Nonetheless, Antioquia’s decimated Indians probably constituted less of a threat to government-backed territorial regimes. More revealing however, Antioquia governors Nicanor Restrepo in the early 1980s and Gilberto Echeverri in the 1990s believed that the “Indian question” had to be addressed before it turned into a bigger problem for public order as was occurring in the more backward Cauca department.<sup>30</sup> Gilberto Echeverri allegedly expressed that “[Antioquia] is not Cauca, Antioquia’s government is not like Cauca’s, and Antioquia’s Indians are not combative like Cauca’s Indians,” and that “the government of Antioquia was not handing out alms, it was rather recognizing Colombia’s historical debt to Indians by actively supporting their demands.”<sup>31</sup>

Although not yet mobilized as an Indian organization, by 1967 Cristianía or *Carmata Rúa* residents began making land claims to recover reserve lands. These claims were denied by the government in 1975 even if the 125 families of subsistence farmers (a total of 900 people) were crowded in the 140 hectares of remaining reserve lands, a fact confirmed by a 1978 INCORA study (the governments land reform institute).<sup>32</sup> By 1979 Cristianía leaders went on field visits to Cauca to learn about CRIC’s land takeovers and to prepare for more contentious action,<sup>33</sup> and by 1980 families began planting in adjacent haciendas to mobilize a pacific land takeover. The government declared that such actions disrupted public order (Salazar 2004) and soon after Mario González and Anibal Tascón were murdered, a crime that compounded Indian unity in

---

<sup>28</sup> Velasco M. 2009b. Interview: Aquileo Yagarí, Cabildo Governor Carmata Rúa Reserve. Jardín, Antioquia

<sup>29</sup> Velasco M. 2009c. Interview: Carlos A. Salazar Director, Departmental Council for Indigenous Affairs. Medellín. On this point however, some analysts have observed that Colombia is a rare case in Latin America where important sectors of the population and some elites share a positive view of Indian demands. See Chirif A, García P. 2007. *Marcando territorio: Progresos y limitaciones de la titulación de territorios indígenas en la Amazonía*. Copenhagen: IWGIA

<sup>30</sup> Velasco M. 2009c. Interview: Carlos A. Salazar Director, Departmental Council for Indigenous Affairs. Medellín

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> Velasco M. 2009b. Interview: Aquileo Yagarí, Cabildo Governor Carmata Rúa Reserve. Jardín, Antioquia

<sup>33</sup> Velasco M. 2009c. Interview: Carlos A. Salazar Director, Departmental Council for Indigenous Affairs. Medellín

support of the takeovers.<sup>34</sup> In 1981 the departmental government intervened in the conflict by buying 200 hectares of hacienda land to expand the Cristianía reserve.

The underpinnings of the Antioquia Indian Organization began in 1982 when the CRIC and the National Indigenous Organization (ONIC) brokered meetings of Indian peoples across the country. Antioquia indigenous leaders Eulalia Yagarí and Guillermo Tascón played an important role in the ONIC's 1982 foundational assembly in Lomas de Ilarco, a meeting that also gave Antioquia Indians the chance to gather and discuss the creation of a departmental-level coordinating instrument (Salazar 2000). Organizational efforts were led by Cristianía and Dabeiba Indians from Antioquia's Andes, a region affected by intense and longer periods of colonization, confirming that organizational efforts are stronger and more contentious in areas of prevailing state governability.<sup>35</sup> Before the institutionalization of the OIA in 1985, an Indigenous Coordinating Committee was formed in 1983 and two regional congresses convened in 1983 and 1985. Government change also supported Indian organization as Antioquia's authorities developed policies for the indigenous population including the 1979 ethno-education program and the 1981 Indian Section in the Secretary of Development. In 1983, the Indian section became the Departmental Committee for Indigenous Development to manage a Special Indian Fund (FEDI) in coordination between Government and indigenous representatives (Salazar 2000). By 1985, the coordinating committee was raised to the level of a Departmental Council for Indigenous Affairs.

Indian activists recognized that Antioquia's government had more resources and political will to negotiate, and took advantage of government instances to forward movement demands, avoiding more radical politics in the process.<sup>36</sup> Notwithstanding, the Departmental Committee for Indigenous Development was slow to act. Even if between 1985 and 1987 it obtained resources and increased its technical profile to support the land purchases and land reform activities of the national agrarian institute INCORA, the OIA decided to organize a takeover of INCORA's regional offices in Medellín in 1987 (Salazar 2000). After this takeover, the OIA, INCORA and the departmental government came to some agreements on how to allocate existing funds, in favor of the communities of La Sucia and Dabeiba, and the OIA also tried to secure technical support for production activities (Organización Indígena de Antioquia. 1987).

---

<sup>34</sup> Velasco M. 2009b. Interview: Aquileo Yagarí, Cabildo Governor Carmata Rúa Reserve. Jardín, Antioquia

<sup>35</sup> Velasco M. 2009a. Interview: Agronomist and Indian Movement Advisor. Bogotá

<sup>36</sup> Velasco M. 2009c. Interview: Carlos A. Salazar Director, Departmental Council for Indigenous Affairs. Medellín

This pressure had an important effect, by 1988, Indians had recovered 908 ha of land, more than was allocated in the previous 20 years (Salazar 2000). OIA continued pressuring the government, and after the takeover of the Cathedral in Medellin in 1990, the OIA brokered by 1994 the expansion of Indian lands by another 13,000 ha during the administrations of Echeverri and later Juan Gómez Martínez. The administration of governor Álvaro Uribe (1995-1997) sustained OIA's territorial politics, adding another 6,800 ha of land (Salazar 2000). In all, by 1999, Antioquia's reserves consisted of an area of 329,476 ha, most located in the department's lowlands. Currently, Antioquia's Indians have titles to 340,000 hectares (Organización Indígena de Antioquia. 2007).

Consistent with Colombia's transitional politics of the 1980s, OIA's organizational field was shaped by major turning points in state-Indian relations as new national and international dispositions redefined the rights of indigenous groups. The most relevant political event was the government's willingness to negotiate a new constitutional charter to solve a crisis of institutional legitimacy and lack of state governability. The 1991 constitution was designed to address the negative effects of massive sociopolitical upheaval, rapid escalation of violence and state failure by providing a wide number of formal mechanisms of political representation and participation in the policy-making process intended to prevent social protest as well as the use of violence in politics. Consequently, by 1991 Colombia had not only ratified the International Labor Organization's Convention No. 169 on the rights to land and self-determination of tribal peoples (see Law 21/91), it had updated nineteenth-century institutional provisions subjecting indigenous groups to the status of wards of the state (law 89 of 1890) and included a number of articles embracing and defending Colombia's ethnic and cultural diversity (art 1, 2, 7) and recognizing indigenous and black self-determination of ancestral lands (Law 21/91).

This framework lay the legal foundations for the collective property rights of Indians to 29.8% of the national territory and of Afro-Colombians to 4.13% of the country's land (Departamento Administrativo de Estadística. 2005) a significant achievement in view of the fact that indigenous people total about 3.4% of the population and the Afro-Colombian descendants of maroon slaves who began a process of "ethnicization" in the 1990s (Restrepo 2002) add up to 0.33% of the Colombian population.<sup>37</sup> The opening of this political opportunity was as much the

---

<sup>37</sup> There are 80 different indigenous ethnic groups speaking 60 different languages. According to the Agustín Codazzi Geographic Institute Indians have collective titles to 34 million hectares and black communities to 4.7

result of international events as of national pressures from Colombia's small but contentious indigenous social movement advocating *autonomy* and *territorial resistance*.

Convention 169 and the constitutional provisions mentioned before are one of a number of policies defining Colombia's territorial regime. In an effort to increase state legitimacy and rationalize spatially the country's development (Ojeda & Asher 2009) articles 151 and title XI of the 1991 constitution established provisions for enacting an Organic Law of Territorial Ordination (Ley Orgánica de Ordenamiento Territorial—LOOT), which Congress has failed to enact on 13 occasions between 1992 and 2003 for lack of consensus on how to reorganize the state's administrative, fiscal, planning and environmental functions (Departamento Nacional de Planeación 2007), including the central government's relations with Indian lands.<sup>38</sup> This has stalled the process of indigenous self-determination and left communities in legal limbo as the government tries to assert an aggressive new set of laws that would dismantle ethnic territoriality in favor of new laws that guarantee government and private corporation access to strategic resources in Indian and black territories (Jaramillo Jaramillo & Velasco 2007). This will be discussed in the conclusion of this paper.

### **Failing to Organize: UTINAYA and Territorial Contention during the Neoliberal period**

By the beginning of the millennium, the 1991 Constitution's democratic promise was watered down by government failure to sustain article 1 declaring Colombia a "social state of law" or a state guided by principles of economic and political democracy and favoring widespread political participation (Castilblanco & Gordo 2002). Colombia's pledge to implement a democratic regime was weakened by the escalation of armed conflict, growing human rights violations and government incapacity to offer justice and security. Rural communities were especially victimized by the violent re-concentration of land. The Interethnic Territorial Union of the Naya UTINAYA emerges from this context of war and displacement,

---

million hectares of land. In the 2005 government census 10.6% of the Colombian population self-identified as black. This figure has been disputed by Afro-Colombian organizations that claim that the census' self-identification questions failed to include racial terminology recognized by many of the country's black and mestizo population (i.e. "moreno" or even "zambo") which led to lower self-identification numbers. The proportion of Colombia's black population should border 25%. Velasco M. 2009d. Personal Communication: José Santos Caicedo, Activist Proceso de Comunidades Negras (PCN) Bogotá

<sup>38</sup> A handful of laws however set territorial regulations pertaining to environmental and natural resources (Law 99/93), administrative, fiscal and political decentralization (Laws 60/93 and 715/01), planning and soil use (Law 388/97) and organization of metropolitan areas (Law 128/94).

and reflects courageous local organizational efforts to save the social fabric of an uprooted community destroyed by the 2001 massacre and a growing coca economy. The people of the Naya—*nayeros*—are nevertheless involved in an innovative, deliberative agenda seeking to strengthen local organizational capacities, form their leadership, and regain control of their territories.

To exemplify the effects of this violence on Colombia's rural sector, between 1960 and 1986 the percentage of arable land owned by small landowners (of 20 ha or less) was reduced from 18% to 15%, and between 1984 and 1996, to 13% (Díaz 1998). By 2005, armed groups and drug-traffickers snatched an additional 4.5 million hectares, thereby securing 70% of the country's most productive agricultural lands.<sup>39</sup> To seize these lands, armies of drug-traffickers and paramilitaries uprooted entire rural populations, leading to one of the world's most appalling internal refugee crisis. According to a government source almost 2.6 million people have been displaced from their lands between 1997 and 2008 (Agencia Presidencial para la Acción Social y la Cooperación Internacional. 2009), and an independent source claims that about 2.9 million Colombians have fled their communities between 1999 and 2008 (Consejería para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento. 2007). Consequently, between 6 and 7% of Colombians and between 20 and 23% of the rural population are internal refugees.

As articulated in UTINAYA public presentations, the Naya River basin contains all of the problems upsetting Colombia and most of the obstacles precluding peaceful solutions to conflict (Unión Interétnica del Río Naya 2003-2005). This socially and biologically diverse region is the shared territory of about 23,000 Afro-Colombians, peasants, and Eperara Siapidaara and Nasa Indians who—except for the Eperara residents of the San Joaquinquito reserve—do not have title to their land. Legal complexity and unclear property rights—ownership of the Naya is claimed by various institutions including a University—is further convoluted by President Álvaro Uribe's (2002-present) refusal to recognize collective land titles of coca-growing communities.<sup>40</sup>

---

<sup>39</sup> 2005. El narcotráfico tiene más de un millón de hectáreas de tierra, dice Contraloría. *Portafolio*:8

<sup>40</sup> A study by the Colombian Institute of Rural Development (INCODER) establishes that ownership of the 173,737 ha comprising the Naya's territory is divided as follows: 97,223 ha. belong to the University of Cauca which has no presence in the region but claims that it obtained titles to the land in 1827 by presidential decree from Simón Bolívar; 28,095 make part of the Farallones State Park; 48,413 are territories with extinguished dominion rights; and 774 belong to the San Joaquinquito reserve (Instituto Colombiano de Desarrollo Rural. 2005. Informe visita previa para el procedimiento de clarificación de la propiedad en la cuenca del Río Naya de conformidad con el Decreto 2663 de 1994, INCODER, Popayán.)

The region expands over mountainous areas starting in the slopes of the Western Cordillera of the Andes range, passing through tropical rainforests, and ending in the mangroves and waters of the Pacific Ocean.<sup>41</sup> Located in the environmentally and biologically diverse Chocó Bio-geographical region,<sup>42</sup> the Naya is consequently a biodiversity hotspot. This environmental wealth has not translated into material welfare for the population however, and the region's mineral resources, woodlands, and mangroves are now coveted by extractive and agricultural industries that, *nayeros* fear, will only exploit the region without investing in its sustainable development (Unión Interétnica del Río Naya 2003a). On the other hand, institutions such as INCORA, the Regional Autonomous Corporations, the Pacific Coast Integral Development Plan (Pladeicop) and the National Training Center (SENA) which were set to get involved in the region's development in the early 1980s either failed to follow through for lack of funding, or their intervention was found to be counterproductive and even environmentally harmful (Castillo 1987; Espinosa 1988). By 1990 some 98 infrastructure and social projects designed for the Pacific Coast failed for lack of funding.<sup>43</sup>

The region's isolation therefore excluded *nayeros* from whatever benefits development projects and social policies could bring, but sheltered them from the effects of violence and ill-conceived economic policies. This meant that the Naya region was poor, but relatively peaceful (García Hierro & Jaramillo Jaramillo 2008). However, in Colombia's escalating war, state absence comes with consequences. In the early 1990s, the Naya became a strategic corridor for illegally armed groups seeking to traffic arms, find safe haven, tax coca production, and by 1999, hide kidnapping victims. According to an interviewed source, the National Liberation Army (ELN) mostly used the Naya as a strategic corridor and the FARC established a financial front to tax the growing coca trade, and occasionally these two groups would battle out territorial control.<sup>44</sup>

As the coca economy grew and fumigations increased in southern departments, coca growers began looking for alternative areas to produce. Cultivation of coca increased in the Naya

---

<sup>41</sup> The Naya demarcates the boundary between the departments of Valle and Cauca, and is contained within the municipalities of Buenaventura in Valle, and López de Micay and Buenos Aires in Cauca.

<sup>42</sup> The Chocó Biogeográfico is a tropical bio-geographical region expanding 187,400 Km<sup>2</sup> over the Darien Province in Panama, the Pacific coasts of Colombia and Ecuador, and the northern tip of Peru. The Andes Cordillera separates this region from the Amazon. One of the most diverse regions in the world, it is characterized by high pluviosity and endemism.

<sup>43</sup> 1990. Embolatado el desarrollo del Pacífico. *eltiempo.com*

<sup>44</sup> Velasco M. 2008b. Interview: Anthropologist and Indian Movement Advisor. Bogotá

in the 1990s, but grew exponentially from the middle to late 2000s. Eyewitness accounts suggest that at this point the Naya was flooded with young men from the southern departments of Nariño and Putumayo who came to grow and process coca introducing inputs including alcohol, gasoline, kerosene, sulfuric acid, or sodium carbonate.<sup>45</sup> This inflow of people increased socioeconomic and environmental problems as the illegal cash crop exhausted traditional forms of subsistence farming, depleting the region's food supply and increasing dependence on outside food markets.<sup>46</sup> Coca paste production residues were being dumped into the river or discarded in the land, leading to intoxication—especially among children—fish stock reduction and drinking water contamination.<sup>47</sup> Naya leaders also witnessed that as the coca economy took hold, traditional forms of social control vanished, leading to prostitution, alcoholism and violence.<sup>48</sup> The growing presence of outsiders inducing illegal economic and military activities in the region increased the Naya's vulnerability to violence and social upheaval.

In 2001, the region was attacked by 500 men from the Calima Block of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). This paramilitary incursion left between 40 and 100 people dead, and 2000 displaced (2001). According to a captured paramilitary leader, drug traffickers from the Valle del Cauca department ordered the April 11 massacre to “clean-up the area” and prevent FARC and ELN control of the drug trade (Vásquez 2001). Other versions establish that there was complicity in the killing spree that affected seventeen upper Naya villages between the Calima Front and members of the Military's Third Brigade, stationed in the city of Cali. Paramilitaries had unimpeded access even if the government had been forewarned of the high likelihood of a massacre occurring (Fairbairn 2005). Eyewitness accounts also suggest that military forces initially entered the Naya to rescue paramilitaries after the massacre, later claiming to have gone to capture them. Residents maintain that the paramilitaries did not know the terrain, got lost in the forests of the lower Naya, at which point some were killed by guerrillas, and began to contact “their cousins” to be rescued (Fairbairn 2005). *Nayeros* believe as well that the paramilitary incursion was in retaliation for the 1999 ELN kidnapping of 186

---

<sup>45</sup> Velasco M. 2008a. Field notes, Interethnic School for Conflict Resolution 2006-2008.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> Velasco M. 2008b. Interview: Anthropologist and Indian Movement Advisor. Bogotá

mostly middle and upper class churchgoers attending mass at La María in Cali, and who were held in the Naya.<sup>49</sup>

Facing these events Naya leaders and residents realized that having lost territorial control, thereby, social control of their lands only worsened their predicament. Three factors had compounded their problems (1) fragile local-level organizing and the absence of a coordinating instance to unite upper and lower Naya residents, (2) domineering external forces with no other interest in the region than depleting human and natural resources and (3) a rapidly changing Colombian government and society from which they were isolated, but which nevertheless defined their prospects as a people and the future of their land (Unión Interétnica del Río Naya 2003b). Some Naya leaders also manifested concern about disinformation or lack of knowledge about complex national and international processes affecting their communities and the few opportunities offered *nayeros* to digest and evaluate such trends.<sup>50</sup> To address some of these issues, but especially, to discuss the future of their land, Naya people began a campaign to enable an inter-ethnic union and a new multi-ethnic political actor that would press for collective titles of the Naya. This new social actor would mirror Indian, black and peasant territorial, resource, trade and kinship interconnectedness, in the words of an Indian movement lawyer and advisor, reflecting an increasingly common new form of pluriethnic territoriality.<sup>51</sup>

By 2002, organization representatives from each group revived previous inter-ethnic conversations that between 1995 and 1997 sought agreements on inter-community boundaries and strategies to gain title to the land (Fairbairn 2005). This time around, the organizational bets were higher as more outside groups got involved in the Naya. The massacre not only brought on governmental attention onto the region, it also alarmed non-governmental organizations, especially regional Indian organizations that quickly began a campaign to support—or prop—grass-roots organizational efforts in the region. Attempts to organize an inter-ethnic union sought to face the humanitarian crisis affecting *nayeros* and offer a way out of conflict. The local initiative was founded on principles of participation and solidarity in order to resist violence and find economic alternatives to coca plantations and extractive activities. On August 2003, one hundred delegates from the Eperara, Páez, black and peasant communities founded the

---

<sup>49</sup> Velasco M. 2008a. Field notes, Interethnic School for Conflict Resolution 2006-2008.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> García Hierro P. 2007. Informe sobre el colectivo de trabajo que acompaña el proceso interétnico del Naya. Unpublished Document, Bogotá

Interethnic Union of the Naya River (UTINAYA). In addition to the Community Council<sup>52</sup> of the Naya, the Indian *cabildos* of the upper and lower Naya, the peasant Community Action Juntas,<sup>53</sup> and a committee of Naya's displaced population, the footnote below lists the organizations present in the deliberative meetings that led to UTINAYA's foundation.<sup>54</sup>

Notwithstanding these efforts UTINAYA has remained extremely frail. The titling process—whereby Colombia's legislation recognizes peasant, Indian and Afro-Colombian rights to land through different legislations—gives each group incentives to negotiate separately. So does the ongoing negotiation with the government on compensation for the Naya massacre. Some NGOs and *nayeros* favor individual economic retributions (an easier objective to achieve) and others favor a collective retribution centered on giving titles to the land and social investment (Velasco 2008a). The coca economy has also led to inter- and intra-ethnic tensions. Polarization ensues as some Naya residents begin to grow coca if they cannot find other viable alternative to make ends meet, and Indians accuse blacks, blacks accuse peasants, and so on and so forth, of growing coca and collaborating with guerrillas in their part of the territory. Finally, the presence of armed groups continues to generate distrust among residents when they perceive willing collaboration with the guerrilla among certain members of the community.<sup>55</sup>

These problems did not stop organizational efforts. In 2007 additional workshops and interethnic meetings were launched, this time leading to the foundation of an Interethnic School for Conflict resolution, which met from 2007 until early 2009.<sup>56</sup> The school congregated peoples from the multi-ethnic Naya and San Juan Rivers to receive support and training from CRIC collaborators and leaders, as well as leaders and activists from other Indian organizations including the OIA and the Valle del Cauca Indian Organization.<sup>57</sup> The group met to discuss a range of issues from the history of the Pacific region to current legislation on rural issues in

---

<sup>52</sup> Community Councils are governing bodies within Afro-Colombian collective territories. They are recognized by the Colombian State as entities of a purely private character, they are dependent on municipalities for the transfer and management of fiscal resources (Fairbairn B. 2005. Human Security of "Democratic Security:" Grassroots Efforts to Build Community and Resist Displacement in Colombia's Naya Region. pp. 1-34: Canadian Consortium on Human Security. Institute of International Relations, University of British Columbia)

<sup>53</sup> Action Boards organize urban or rural communities and establish a direct link between with the government.

<sup>54</sup> CRIC, Association of Northern Cauca Indian *Cabildos* (ACIN), Black Community Process (PCN), National Indigenous Organization (ONIC), Association of Indian *Cabildos* from the Pacific Region of the Valle Department (ACIVA), SwissAid, Cajambre River Community Councils, Upper San Jorge River Embera *Cabildo*, Mother Laura Missionaries, National Indigenous Peace Council, and the Foundation for Education and Development (FEDES).

<sup>55</sup> Velasco M. 2008a. Field notes, Interethnic School for Conflict Resolution 2006-2008.

<sup>56</sup> Colectivo de Trabajo Jenzerá. 2007. Encuentro Interétnico. Centro Comunitario el Guabito, Resguardo López Adentro (Corinto, Cauca May 26-28).

<sup>57</sup> Velasco M. 2008a. Field notes, Interethnic School for Conflict Resolution 2006-2008.

general, and natural resources in particular. They also sat to discuss negotiation strategies to approach different governmental instances and recover territorial control (Colectivo de Trabajo Jenzerá 2007). Some school participants have also manifested that school attendance has increased trust among some leaders after having the time and opportunity to discuss delicate issues affecting the region and inter-ethnic relations (Velasco 2008a).

According to internal evaluations of the Inter-Ethnic School for Conflict Resolution carried out by Jenzerá—the organization that helped facilitate the workshops in conjunction with CRIC, OIA, PCN and ORIVAC leaders—in combination with school participants, the school improved beneficiaries' analytical skills, qualified younger leaders, and increased negotiation and dialogue capabilities. The school helped organize strategies to follow up on land titling procedures and opened a space to formulate viable initiatives of territorial management. Inspired by the school some participants replicated workshops, and even revived communal interethnic meetings between black and Indians, especially in the Lower San Juan River. The school experience is being evaluated by other communities facing similar problems and most importantly, it has increased organizational activities in the Naya River by offering an additional space for leaders from that region to meet and deliberate.<sup>58</sup>

The school's second workshop for example (October 4-8, 2007) produced materials on territorial control and conflict demanded by and widely disseminated among different ethnic-territorial organizations across the country. Summing up a very dense discussion, in this workshop, participants took time to evaluate the territorial and economic practices and visions held by ethnic territorial social actors and contrasted these visions to state-centered neoliberal and rationalist logics of land and resources.<sup>59</sup> Among other things, territories were defined as life spaces historically linked to past and future generations that should not be fractured spatially. In contrast, the state accepts territorial divisions, divorces resources from the land, and favors overexploitation. This rationalist logic is viewed with disapproval. In terms of the economic uses of territory, workshop participants felt that land and resources were there to sustain life and happiness, and not wealth accumulation and uprooting. An important emphasis was placed on the defense of food security.<sup>60</sup>

---

<sup>58</sup> Personal communication, Colectivo de Trabajo Jenzerá, October 2009.

<sup>59</sup> Colectivo de Trabajo Jenzerá. 2007. Escuela de formación interétnica para la resolución de conflictos. Segundo taller de capacitación. Territorio, control y conflictos (IDEBIC, Florida, Valle 4-8 October).

<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

## Conclusions

This paper underscores the transformative potential of conflict as it may catalyze warranted change in some contexts (Turner 2004) and challenge power structures holding back or limiting local autonomy. During episodes of conflict, community members mobilize resources from inside and outside their communities, and their ability to make internal and external alliances will determine institutional outcomes (Lesorogol 2008). Violent and non-violent conflict unmask vested interests, power relations and institutional failures, de-stabilizing and transforming politics at the same time and making it possible to “shape the political arena” in favor of one group or interest (Collier & Collier 2002).

Ethnic-territorial movements promoting similar institutional principles found to effectively manage the commons would be a positive environmental governance force in Colombia. But failed democratization and state incapacity to implement 1991 constitutional provisions for more inclusive territorial regimes is reducing the potential of local communities that favor common property regimes. Uprooting and persecution weakens local level organizations and destroys social networks, undermining local authority and debilitating institutions found to produce effective environmental management by the CPR literature. This literature establishes that resources can be managed sustainably by small, interdependent, homogeneous and clearly bounded groups of users, who share norms, have high social capital, and benefit from appropriate leadership (Agrawal 2002; 2003). The group of users must live in the same area where the CPR system is located, be highly dependent on the resource, and have fair access to resources managed with simple, locally devised and easily enforced rules (Agrawal 2002; 2003). In sum, these are principles relating to clear property rights, autonomy, and democratic procedures.

This comparison shows that communities seeking autonomy will be resilient if they unleash strategies that allow them to survive and resist violent processes of accumulation and capitalist expansion, as the Cauca example demonstrates; use political opportunities wisely and work with strategic elite allies, as the Antioquia case shows; or improve cognitive frameworks to help the community interpret its predicaments, as the Naya case highlights. The Naya case also underscores the potential of deliberation to smooth divisiveness in multi-ethnic settings by enabling a more homogeneous social actor, one characterized by the principle of unity within diversity and able to overcome problems of collective action in governing resources.

Finally, this paper finds that as the current government's aggressive plans to export more of the country's natural resources is translated into institutional instruments—mining, forest, hydrocarbon, water or agrarian reform laws guided by free-market principles—that commoditize natural resources and weaken local communities, contention over territorial regimes will increase. This contention will respond to three interrelated processes affecting Colombia's current territorial regimes. First the de-nationalization of the country's natural resources; second government attempts to dismantle the legislation that protects the rights of rural communities and the rights of ethnic groups to self-determination; and third government failure to lessen violent de-territorialization and community uprooting resulting from the armed conflict. Ethnic social movements see these processes as a violent economic reordering that depends on disempowering and reducing their autonomy, often with government support. These policies favor the property rights of private investors, and deliberately leave ethnic rights to territorial autonomy in a legal limbo.

## References

1990. Embolado el desarrollo del Pacífico. *eltiempo.com*
2001. Huyen Desplazados del Naya. *eltiempo.com*
2005. El narcotráfico tiene más de un millón de hectáreas de tierra, dice Contraloría. *Portafolio*:8
- Agencia Presidencial para la Acción Social y la Cooperación Internacional. 2009. *Registro único de población desplazada*.  
<http://www.accionsocial.gov.co/contenido/contenido.aspx?catID=383&conID=556>
- Agrawal A. 2002. Common Resources and Institutional Sustainability. In *The Drama of the Commons*, ed. E Ostrom, T Dietz, N Dolsak, P Stern, S Stonich, E Weber, pp. 41-86. Washington, DC: National Academy Press
- Agrawal A. 2003. Sustainable Governance of Common-Pool Resources: Context, Methods, and Politics. *Annual Review of Anthropology* 32:243-62
- Archila M. 2003. Colombia 1975-2000: de crisis en crisis. Contexto. In *25 Años de luchas sociales en Colombia*, ed. M Archila, Á Delgado, MC García, E Prada. Bogotá: CINEP
- Asociación de Usuarios Campesinos. 1974. *Nuestra lucha es tu lucha*. Bogotá: ANUC
- Avirama J. 1979. Carta dirigida al Señor Julián Narváez, Jefe de Asuntos Indígenas, Ministerio de Gobierno. Popayán
- Beaumont J, Nicholls W. 2007. Between Relationality and Territoriality: Investigating the Geographies of Justice Movements in The Netherlands and the United States. *Environment and Planning* 39:2554-74
- Carruthers D, Rodriguez P. 2009. Mapuche Protest, Environmental Conflict and Social Movement Linkage in Chile. *Third World Quarterly* 30:743 - 60
- Castilblanco L, Gordo M. 2002. Colombia: Una sociedad excluyente. In *Colombia, entre la exclusión y el desarrollo*, ed. L Garay, pp. 3-42. Bogotá: Contraloría General de la República

- Castillo LC. 1987. *Actividades productivas del Naya costero del Pacífico colombiano*. Universidad del Valle, Cali
- Castrillón D. 1970. *De la colonia al subdesarrollo*. Popayán: Editorial Universidad
- Castrillón D. 1973. *El indio Quintín Lame*. Bogotá: Ediciones Tercer Mundo
- Chernela J. 1988. Recuperating Devastated Lands: An Experimental Farm in Cauca, Colombia. *Cultural Survival* 12:53-4
- Chirif A, García P. 2007. *Marcando territorio: Progresos y limitaciones de la titulación de territorios indígenas en la Amazonía*. Copenhagen: IWGIA
- Colectivo de Trabajo Jenzerá. 2007. Escuela de formación interétnica para la resolución de conflictos. Segundo taller de capacitación. Territorio, control y conflictos (IDEBIC, Florida, Valle 4-8 October).
- Colectivo de Trabajo Jenzerá. 2007. Encuentro Interétnico. Centro Comunitario el Guabito, Resguardo López Adentro (Corinto, Cauca May 26-28).
- Collier RB, Collier D. 2002. *Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame
- Consejería para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento. 2007. Huyendo de la Guerra. *CODHES Informa*
- Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca Epdd. 1989. *Plan de desarrollo, un esfuerzo hacia el futuro*. Popayán: CRIC
- Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca. 1975. Tercer Encuentro indígena del cauca. *Boletín del instituto de antropología* 4:49-58
- Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca. 1977. *Historia política de los Paeces*. Popayán: CRIC
- Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca. 1979. *Análisis de su organización y sus luchas* Popayán: CRIC
- Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca. 1980. *Documento de discusión sobre el marco ideológico del movimiento indígena*. Popayán: CRIC
- Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca. 1983a. *Cómo nos organizamos*. Popayán: CRIC
- Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca. 1983b. *Nuestras luchas de ayer y de hoy*. Popayán: CRIC
- Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca. 1989. *Historia del CRIC*. Popayán: CRIC
- Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca. 2007. Presentación de tierras y presentación institucional. Popayán: CRIC
- Cortés P. 1984. *Desarrollo de una organización indígena: El Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca, CRIC*. Popayán: Banco de la República, Fundación para la promoción de la investigación y la tecnología
- Departamento Administrativo de Estadística. 2005. *Censo General 2005*. Bogotá: DANE
- Departamento Administrativo de Estadística. 2007. *Colombia, una nación multicultural. Su diversidad étnica*. Bogotá: DANE
- Departamento Nacional de Planeación. 2007. Notas sobre el Ordenamiento Territorial y los proyectos de Ley Orgánica sobre la materia. ed. DNP-DDTS-Subdirección de Ordenamiento y Desarrollo Territorial, pp. 1-8. Bogotá, Colombia: DNP
- Díaz A. 1998. *Colombia: La cuestión agraria*.  
[http://www.apolinardiaz.org/documentosdetema.php?id\\_tema=8](http://www.apolinardiaz.org/documentosdetema.php?id_tema=8)
- Díaz Z. 2001. Creación de dos repúblicas de españoles y de "indios". In *Territorios posibles: Historia, geografía y cultura del cauca*, ed. G Barona, C Gnecco, pp. 121-51. Popayán
- Dietz T, Ostrom E, Stern P. 2003. The Struggle to Govern the Commons. *Science* 302:1907-12

- Eckstein S. 1989. Power and Popular Protest in Latin America. In *Power and Popular Protest in Latin America*, ed. S Eckstein. Berkeley: University of California Press
- Edwards S, Steiner R. 2000. On the Crisis Hypothesis of Economic Reform: Colombia 1989-91. *Cuadernos de Economía* 37:1-51
- Espinosa A. 1988. *Impacto del crédito en la población de pescadores del Río Naya*. Universidad del Valle, Cali
- Estudiantes de Antropología de la Universidad de los Andes. 1980. Comunicado de estudiantes de antropología de la Universidad de los Andes acerca del Proyecto de Ley para las comunidades indígenas. Mimeo. Bogotá
- Fairbairn B. 2005. Human Security of "Democratic Security:" Grassroots Efforts to Build Community and Resist Displacement in Colombia's Naya Region. pp. 1-34: Canadian Consortium on Human Security. Institute of International Relations, University of British Columbia
- Findji MT, Rojas JM. 1985. *Territorio, economía y sociedad Paez*. Cali: CIDSE, Universidad del Valle
- García Hierro P. 2007. Informe sobre el colectivo de trabajo que acompaña el proceso interétnico del Naya. Unpublished Document, Bogotá
- García Hierro P, Jaramillo Jaramillo E. 2008. *Pacífico colombiano: El caso del Naya*. Bogotá: Fundación Jenzerá; Copenhague: IWGIA
- Goemans H. 2006. Bounded Communities: Territoriality, territorial attachments, and conflict. In *Territoriality and Conflict in an Era of Globalization*, ed. B Walter, M Kahler, pp. 25-61. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Gros C. 1991. *Colombia indígena: Identidad cultural y cambio social*. Bogotá: CEREC
- Hardin G. 1968. The Tragedy of the Commons. *Science* 162:1243-8
- Hernández E. 2004. *Resistencia civil artesana de paz: Experiencias indígenas, afrodescendientes y campesinas*. Bogotá: Editorial Pontificia Universidad Javeriana
- Instituto Colombiano de Desarrollo Rural. 2005. Informe visita previa para el procedimiento de clarificación de la propiedad en la cuenca del Río Naya de conformidad con el Decreto 2663 de 1994, INCODER, Popayán
- Jaramillo Jaramillo E, Velasco M. 2007. Las políticas públicas de Uribe contra los territorios de indígenas, negros y campesinos. *Nueva Gaceta*
- Kay C. 1989. *Latin American Theories of Development and Underdevelopment*. New York: Routledge
- Lame MQ. 1971. *En defensa de mi raza*. Bogotá: Editorial Editexos
- Lame MQ. 1973. *Las luchas del indio que bajó de la montaña al valle de la "civilización"*. Bogotá: Comité de Defensa del Indio
- Lame MQ. 1987. *Los pensamientos del indio que se educó dentro de las selvas colombianas*. Bogotá: ONIC
- Laurent V. 2005. *Pueblos indígenas, espacios políticos y movilización electoral, 1990-1998: Motivaciones, campos de acción e impactos*. Bogotá: Instituto Colombiano de Antropología e Historia
- Lesorogol C. 2008. *Contesting the Commons: Privatizing Pastoral Lands in Kenya*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press
- McAdam D, Scott R. 2005. Organizations and Movements. In *Social Movements and Organization Theory*, ed. GF Davis, D McAdam, R Scott, MN Zald, pp. 4-40. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

- McAdam D, Tarrow S, Tilly C. 2001. *Dynamics of Contention*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Ojeda D, Asher K. 2009. Producing Nature and Making the State: Ordenamiento Territorial in the Pacific Lowlands of Colombia. *Geoforum*:292-302
- Organización Indígena de Antioquia. 1987. *Que nos devuelvan nuestras tierras y se nos titulen como resguardos: Conclusiones del Tercer Encuentro Indígena de Antioquia (Caimán Nuevo, Necoclí, 16-20 diciembre de 1987)*. Medellín: OIA
- Organización Indígena de Antioquia. 2007. *Política organizativa de los pueblos indígenas de Antioquia: Volver a recorrer el camino*. Medellín: OIA
- Ostrom E. 1990. *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Ostrom E, Dietz T, Dolsak N, Stern P, Stonich S, Weber E, eds. 2002. *The Drama of the Commons*. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press
- Pachón X. 1996. Los Nasa o la gente páez. In *Geografía humana de Colombia. Región Andina Central.*, ed. Instituto Colombiano de Cultura Hispánica, pp. 87-150. Bogotá: Instituto Colombiano de Cultura Hispánica
- Paz JM. 2001. Estructura de la tenencia de la tierra: 1973-1997. In *Territorios posibles: Historia, geografía y cultural del Cauca*, ed. G Barona, C Gnecco, pp. 199-215. Popayán: Universidad del Cauca
- Restrepo E. 2002. Políticas de la alteridad: Etnización de "comunidad negra" en el Pacífico sur colombiano. *Journal of Latin American Anthropology* 7:34-59
- Rodríguez A, Pulido C, Prada E, Rojas Á. 2005. Resistir para vivir: Una mirada histórica al movimiento indio del Cauca: 1970-2000. *Polémica*
- Salazar CA. 2000. *Dayi Drua - Nuestra tierra: Comunidad y territorio indígena en Antioquia*. Medellín: Gerencia Indígena, ONIC
- Salazar CA. 2004. La planeación participativa del desarrollo y de la política territorial en la Organización Indígena de Antioquia -OIA, Cecoin, Bogotá
- Sawyer S. 2004. *Crude Chronicles: Indigenous Politics, Multinational Oil, and Neoliberalism in Ecuador*. Durham: Duke University Press
- Tang C-P, Tang S-Y. 2001. Negotiated Autonomy: Transforming Self-Governing Institutions for Local Common-Pool Resources in Two Tribal Villages in Taiwan. *Human Ecology* 29:49-67
- Tilly C. 2001. Mechanisms in Political Processes. *Annual Review of Political Science* 4:21-41
- Turner MD. 2004. Political ecology and the moral dimensions of "resource conflicts": the case of farmer-herder conflicts in the Sahel. *Political Geography* 23:863-89
- Unión Interétnica del Río Naya. 2003a. Cuarto Encuentro Interétnico del Naya. Informe de la Junta Directiva. Alto Naya: UTINAYA
- Unión Interétnica del Río Naya. 2003b. Primer encuentro interétnico del Naya. Tema: Gobierno y autonomía. San Francisco del Naya
- Unión Interétnica del Río Naya. 2003-2005. El Naya, notas para exposición en Asamblea del Nilo. Buenaventura?
- Uribe MV. 2007. *Salvo el poder todo es ilusión*. Bogotá: Universidad Javeriana, Instituto Pensar
- Vásquez CR. 2001. La Batalla Secreta por El Naya. In *eltiempo.com*. Bogotá
- Velasco M. 2005. Group Interview: Indigenous Movement Advisors Bogotá
- Velasco M. 2008a. Field notes, Interethnic School for Conflict Resolution 2006-2008.
- Velasco M. 2008b. Interview: Anthropologist and Indian Movement Advisor. Bogotá

- Velasco M. 2009a. Interview: Agronomist and Indian Movement Advisor. Bogotá
- Velasco M. 2009b. Interview: Aquileo Yagarí, Cabildo Governor Carmata Rúa Reserve. Jardín, Antioquia
- Velasco M. 2009c. Interview: Carlos A. Salazar Director, Departmental Council for Indigenous Affairs. Medellín
- Velasco M. 2009d. Personal Communication: José Santos Caicedo, Activist Proceso de Comunidades Negras (PCN) Bogotá
- Walter B. 2006. Conclusion. In *Territoriality and Conflict in an Era of Globalization*, ed. B Walter, M Kahler, pp. 288-96. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Yashar D. 2006. *Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Zamosc L. 1983. *Los usuarios campesinos y las luchas por la tierra en los años 70*. Bogotá: CINEP
- Zuluaga F. 2001. El proyecto de indianidad. In *Historia, geografía y cultura del Cauca: Territorios Posibles*, ed. G Barona, C Gnecco, pp. 153-68. Popayán: Universidad del Cauca